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ONE TEXT, ANOTHER RENDERING NOW: IN
THE WAKE OF HIVELY V. IVY TECH CMTY.
COLL. OF IND., THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE
TO DEFINE SEX DISCRIMINATION UNDER
TITLE VII
Kaitlyn Krall
“If a problem can't be solved within the frame it was conceived,
the solution lies in reframing the problem.”1
This article centers on the Seventh Circuit decision, Hively
v. Ivy Tech Comm. Coll., which became the first U.S. Circuit
decision to declare that sexual orientation discrimination is a type
of sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. The introduction highlights the difficulty in defining sex
discrimination and provides an overview of the various approaches
taken to try and define it. Part II provides background information
on how sex discrimination became a part of Title VII, the
development of sex discrimination through the courts, the changes
in the Supreme Court’s understanding of sexual orientation, and
the EEOC’s decision to expand sex discrimination. Part III
provides the facts surrounding Hively and an explanation of its
various opinions. Part IV critiques the Seventh Circuit’s
arguments because, while the decision correctly determines that
sexual orientation discrimination is a form of sex discrimination, it
fails to provide a new framework in which to make this
determination, making it difficult for other courts to apply the
decision’s rationale. Finally, Part V discusses the impact of Hively
and posits that, while the decision adds to the increasing number of
voices for sexual orientation protection under Title VII, it may
ultimately hinder that goal through its limited change in
methodology for determining what constitutes sex discrimination.
1
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DISCRIMINATION: INTRODUCTION
COURTS’ APPROACHES TO SEX

Imagine you are an airline stewardess in the 1960s and you
just got engaged.2 On what should be a joyful day, your employer
tells you that you will no longer be able to work for the airline
because their policy is that only unmarried women can work as a
stewardess.3 At the time, you would not have been able to claim
employment discrimination because the employment policy did
not “technically” discriminate on the basis of sex as it did not
divide men and women into two groups.4 When stewardesses
brought their sex discrimination claims, the airlines argued that
being unmarried was a legitimate job requirement because their
passengers (mostly male) preferred unmarried stewardesses;
moreover, married stewardesses would create administrative
burdens due to their home life demands.5 When this social policy
argument failed, in large part because of the rise of the women’s
movement, the airlines posited a new theory: the policy
2

See generally Cary Franklin, Inventing the “Traditional Concept” of Sex
Discrimination, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1348–54 (2012) (explaining battle
over whether airline policies that terminated employment when
stewardesses married or reached their early thirties constituted actionable
discrimination based on sex or benign discrimination based on age and
marital status).
3
See id. (explaining basis of hypothetical); see also id. at 1353 (quoting
statement made by airline representative during EEOC testimony on
stewardess issue stating that EEOC “has no authority to act in respect to
complaints which are in fact based upon considerations of anything other
than race, creed, color, nationality [sic] origin and sex”).
4
See supra note 2 (explaining basis of hypothetical); see also Franklin,
supra note 2, at 1353 (citing to court decision which held that airline
policies did not constitute discrimination because policy did not divide
employees into two perfectly sex-differentiated groups).
5
See Franklin, supra note 2, at 1349 (stating that airlines argued that hiring
only young, single women as stewardesses was a legitimate business
requirement because of passenger preference, of fear that husbands would
call office to ask about wives, and that women would be unable to balance
home and job).
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discriminated based on marital status, not sex, because the policy
did not sort men and women according to sex.6 The courts began
to utilize this argument as a possible test for determining sex
discrimination.7 Yet courts quickly stripped the normative
analysis in sex discrimination determinations, describing the test
as an objective rule that does not require additional value
judgments.8 In doing so, the courts ignored the complexity of sex
discrimination and prevented individuals like the stewardesses
from bringing successful sex discrimination claims.9
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it is illegal
for an employer to terminate employment or refuse to hire an
individual based on the individual’s sex.10 This statute provides a
6

See id. at 1351–52 (noting that airlines began to change argument to one
where policies were age and marital status discrimination).
7
See id. at 1353 (highlighting first federal case that dealt with suit brought
by stewardesses wherein court determined that policies did not count as sex
discrimination because they did not divide men and women into two
different groups but also rested decision on normative reasons); see also id.
at 1354–55 (explaining the 5th Circuit’s decisions to use anti-classification
reasoning while also utilizing normative arguments about sex and family
roles).
8
See id. at 1353 (explaining that less than a decade after first federal case,
Supreme Court no longer rested its decision on normative arguments but
rather on objective rule without value judgments).
9
See id. at 1353–54 (arguing that courts used anti-classification approach to
mask that determinations were based on social judgment about gender-based
regulation); see id. at 1335 (noting that no one at EEOC after Title VII was
enacted had comparable experience in women’s rights nor did employees
expect to work in sex discrimination field); see also id. at 1338 (citing
EEOC Commissioner’s statement that “the sex provision of Title VII is
mysterious and difficult to understand and control”).
10
See generally Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000(e)–2(a) (2017) (“Employer Practices. It shall be unlawful employment
practice for an employer -- (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
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needed cause of action for many but gives rise to the question of
“what is sex discrimination?”11 The courts have changed their
answer to this question several times but traditionally defined it as
discrimination “against women because they are women and
against men because they are men.”12 Sex, the court added, meant
biologically female or male.13 Until recently, the federal courts
agreed with this “traditional” definition of sex discrimination and
consistently excluded sexual orientation claims, arguing that
sexual orientation and sex are two different characteristics.14

status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.”).
11
See Sex Discrimination, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, (10th ed. 2014)
(defining sex discrimination as “discrimination based on gender, esp.
against women. . . . The terminology is gradually shifting. Increasingly in
medicine and sociology, gender is distinguished from sex. Gender refers to
the psychological and societal aspects of being male or female; sex refers
specifically to the physical aspects.”). Compare Sex, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining sex as “1. The sum of the
peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from a female
organism; gender; 2. Sexual intercourse”), with AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, APA
DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOL. (2d ed. 2015) (defining sex as “(1) the traits that
distinguish between males and females. Sex refers especially to physical
and biological traits, whereas gender refers especially to social or cultural
traits, although the distinction between the two terms is not regularly
observed; (2) the physiological and psychological processes related to
procreation and erotic pleasure.”).
12
Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984); see
also Franklin, supra note 2, at 1315 (defining the traditional concept of sex
discrimination as “the idea that employer conduct is discriminatory only and
whenever it bifurcates employees along biological sex lines”).
13
See Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085 (holding that sex means biologically male or
female until Congress decides otherwise). Compare supra note 11
(explaining different definitions of sex and gender), with Hively v. Ivy Tech.
Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 353 (7th Cir. 2017) (Posner, J.,
concurring) (concluding that sex means both gender and sexual orientation).
14
See infra note 76 (discussing precedent in other circuit courts which use
“traditional” concept of sex discrimination and hold that sexual orientation
claims are not actionable under Title VII). But cf. Missouri v. Holland, 252
U.S. 416, 433–34 (1920) (arguing that “[t]he case before us must be
considered in the light of our whole experience and note merely in that of
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Regardless, the Supreme Court has gradually re-interpreted sex
discrimination to include other less “traditional” understandings of
sex discrimination.15 Most notably, in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, the Supreme Court found that sex stereotyping16 was a
form of sex discrimination because determining that a female
employee should not be aggressive is a sex-conscious decision.17
The Court’s decision to include sex stereotyping as a form
of sex discrimination opened the door to previously barred sexual
orientation discrimination18 claims.19 Struggling to
compartmentalize the two claims, some courts barred any claims
with a sexual orientation component, while others attempted to
what was said a hundred years ago . . . . We must consider what this
country has become in deciding what the amendment has reserved.”).
15
See infra notes 58–62 and accompanying text (discussing cases where the
Supreme Court found that sex discrimination covered other situations
besides “traditional” concept).
16
See HILARY M. LIPS, SEX AND GENDER: AN INTRODUCTION 2 (6th ed.
2017) (defining sex stereotyping as “socially shared beliefs about what
qualities can be assigned to individuals based on their membership in the
male or female half of the human race.”).
17
See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(asserting that “[i]n saying that gender played a motivating part in an
employment decision, we mean that, if we asked the employer at the
moment of the decision what its reasons were . . ., one of those reasons
would be that the applicant or employee was a woman. In the specific
context of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on the basis of a belief
that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the
basis of gender.”).
18
See Sexual Orientation Discrimination, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY,
(10th ed. 2014) (defining it as “[d]iscrimination based on a person's
predisposition or inclination to be romantically or sexually attracted to a
certain type of person (i.e., heterosexuality, homosexuality, bisexuality, or
asexuality), or based on a person's gender identity (i.e., a person's internal
sense of gender).”).
19
See Hively v. Ivy Tech. Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 830 F.3d 698, 700 (7th Cir.
2016) (explaining Seventh Circuit’s precedent that sexual orientation
discrimination is not actionable under Title VII); see also id. at 705 (noting
that after Price Waterhouse there was a line of cases brought by gay,
lesbian, bisexual, and transsexual employees who framed argument in
gender non-conformity terms).
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parse out facts supporting a sex discrimination claim from those
supporting a sexual orientation claim, and then only looking at the
sex discrimination claim.20 However, in doing so, the courts
created a bizarre situation where gay persons21 who “looked gay”22
could bring successful sex stereotyping claims, while gay persons
who were known to be gay but did not exhibit “gay
characteristics”23 could not.24
Then in 2017, the Seventh Circuit broke away from its
precedent and included sexual orientation discrimination as
prohibited under Title VII.25 In Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of
Ind., where an openly gay woman brought a sex discrimination
case against her employer alleging sexual orientation
discrimination, the Seventh Circuit held that sexual orientation
20

See infra notes 69–77 and accompanying text (discussing other circuits’
approaches to sexual orientation in sex discrimination claims).
21
Throughout my Note, I utilize the term “gay persons” in reference to
individuals, both male and female, who are sexually attracted to individuals
of his or her respective sexes. See Committee on Lesbian and Gay Concerns
American Psychological Association, Avoiding Heterosexual Bias in
Language, 46 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 9, 973–74 (1991) (recommending the use
of the terms “lesbian, gay, or gay persons” as opposed to “homosexual”
because of its connection with negative stereotypes).
22
See Brian Soucek, Perceived Homosexuals: Looking Gay Enough for
Title VII, 63 AM. U.L. REV. 715, 717 (2014) (arguing that gay persons are
protected when their sexuality is perceivable via the senses as something
that can be literally seen or heard). In his article, Brian Soucek utilizes this
term to highlight the difference between gay persons who are perceived by
others to be gay from those who are known to be gay. Here, individuals
who “look gay” are those who have a better chance of bringing a successful
gender non-conformity claim.
23
See id. at 748–49 (providing sample of characteristics that courts have
determined violate gender stereotypes including hairstyle, way of walking,
way of talking, and appearance with most being noticed in connection with
idea that individual is not acting manly enough or is acting too feminine).
24
See id. at 716 (explaining that if you look gay at work you may be able to
bring a claim, but if employers only know that you are gay, then you are
unprotected under Title VII).
25
For a further discussion of the Seventh Circuit’s precedent see infra notes
78–81 and accompanying text; see also Hively v. Ivy Tech. Cmty. Coll. of
Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 351 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding that sexual orientation
discrimination falls under sex discrimination).
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discrimination is sex discrimination under Title VII because sexual
orientation discrimination necessarily involves thinking about
sex.26 The majority determined that there are three perspectives
that justify, including sexual orientation discrimination under sex
discrimination.27 Although Hively expanded sex discrimination to
include sexual orientation discrimination and thereby fixed the
arbitrary distinction between looking gay and being gay, the four
opinions highlight the difficulty that courts still face when
interpreting sex discrimination under Title VII.28
This Note discusses the development of sex discrimination
under Title VII and argues that while the Seventh Circuit correctly
held that sexual orientation discrimination is a form of sex
discrimination, the court did so using incorrect arguments; rather
than adopting a dynamic approach to statutory interpretation that
melds gender non-conformity cases with developments in our
understanding of sex, gender, and sexual orientation, the court
continued to view sex discrimination in the same anticlassification way29 that was originally used to limit the scope of

26

See Hively v. Ivy Tech. Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 350 (7th Cir.
2017) (stating that “[i]t would require considerable calisthenics to remove
the ‘sex’ from ‘sexual orientation.’”); see also id. at 341 (providing factual
background of case).
27
See infra notes 123–141 and accompanying text for further discussion of
majority’s three perspectives on sexual orientation discrimination.
28
See generally Hively, 853 F.3d at 339 (recognizing that there is a
majority, two concurring, and dissenting opinion); see also infra notes 108–
115 and accompanying text (highlighting importance of majority’s
interpretive framework); e.g., infra notes 142–147 and accompanying text
(noting type of interpretation that Judge Posner’s concurrence uses); infra
notes 160–163 and accompanying text (noting type of interpretation that
Judge Flaum’s concurrence uses); infra notes 167–172 and accompanying
text (noting type of interpretation that Judge Sykes’s dissent uses).
29
See Franklin, supra note 2, at 1309 (defining anti-classification in relation
to sex discrimination as “divid[ing] men and women into two groups,
perfectly differentiated along biological sex lines”); see also Jack M. Balkin
& Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification
or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 10 (2003) (stating that the
anti-classification “principle holds that the government may not classify
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sex discrimination.30 Part II summarizes the history of Title VII’s
sex provision, as well as federal courts’ and the EEOC’s
interpretation of sex discrimination.31 Next, Part III provides the
facts of Hively, while Part IV recounts Hively’s various opinions
and approaches to defining sex discrimination.32 Part V critiques
Hively’s interpretative methods, and, finally, Part VI notes that,
due in part to Hively’s arguments, there remains uncertainty for
employers and employees, while also creating confusion about
how to understand sex discrimination in future cases.33
II.
WALKING
THE
TIGHTROPE: APPROACHES
TO
SEPARATING SEX AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION
Hively’s place in sex discrimination jurisprudence is
underpinned by Title VII, historical debate, Supreme Court
decisions both on Title VII and on sexual orientation generally,
circuit courts’ differing opinions, and the EEOC.34 Historically,

people either overtly or surreptitiously on the basis of a forbidden category:
for example, their race.”).
30
For further discussion of the Hively opinions’ struggle with interpretive
framework, see infra notes 182–221 and accompanying text; see also
Franklin, supra note 2, at 1316 (asserting that “[t]alk of deference to the
legislature and fidelity to tradition replaced discussion of the need to
preserve the traditional family and women’s role within in . . . . Courts’
continued adherence to the ‘traditional concept’ of sex discrimination
significantly limits Title VII’s scope and insulates from judicial scrutiny
various forms of regulation that maintains social stratification.”).
31
See infra notes 34–89 and accompanying text.
32
See infra notes 90–181 and accompanying text for Part III; see infra notes
182–232 and accompanying text for Part IV.
33
See infra notes 233–249 and accompanying text for Part V; see infra
notes 250–257 and accompanying text for Part VI.
34
For discussion of Title VII and the historical debate surrounding it, see
infra notes 44–56 and accompanying text. For further discussion of
Supreme Court decisions, see infra notes 57–67 and accompanying text.
For further discussion of circuit court opinions, see infra notes 68–81 and
accompanying text. For further discussion of EEOC’s viewpoint, see infra
notes 83–89 and accompanying text.
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Title VII did not provide protection for sexual orientation claims.35
This occurred in large part because of the courts’ adoption of an
anti-classification approach, which transformed interpreting sex
discrimination from a dynamic statutory interpretation36 approach
to a focus on formal logic.37 The historic interpretation changed
when the Supreme Court expanded sex discrimination to include,
most notably, sexual harassment and sex stereotyping claims.38
Regardless of sex discrimination’s expanded definition, the circuit
courts refused to expand it to sexual orientation discrimination,
using various types of interpretive methods such as legislative
intent, common meaning at the time of enactment, and logical
reasoning to support their decisions.39 Despite this, gay persons
started to bring successful claims under sex stereotyping because
employers viewed the employees’ mannerisms as being contrary to
societal norms about how a person of a particular sex should
behave, i.e., a gay man as acting effeminately or a gay woman as
acting manly.40 In response, the EEOC determined that sexual

35

See infra note 76 for precedent in circuit courts holding that sexual
orientation discrimination does not fall under Title VII.
36
See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U.
PA. L. REV. 1479, 1483 (1987) (defining dynamic statutory interpretation as
“the process of understanding a text created in the past and applying it to a
present problem.”); see generally id. at 1482–97 (positing his cautious
model of dynamic statutory interpretation).
37
See Franklin, supra note 2, at 1378–80 (concluding that the traditional
concept of sex discrimination is used to limit reach of sex discrimination so
that sexual minorities cannot bring claims); see also Balkin & Siegel, supra
note 29, at 10 (explaining the anti-classification argument); cf. Suzanne
Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728 (2011)
(discussing how the comparator method limits the definition of
discrimination and prevents actual cases of discrimination from succeeding).
38
For further discussion of Supreme Court decisions expanding sex
discrimination, see infra notes 57–62 and accompanying text.
39
For further discussion of how courts have attempted to limit reach of sex
discrimination, see infra notes 68–77 and accompanying text.
40
See infra note 76 (citing cases where courts try to draw a line between
gender non-conformity and sexual orientation discrimination claims).
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orientation discrimination does fall under Title VII.41 In Hively,
the Seventh Circuit used the EEOC’s arguments to find that sexual
orientation is protected under Title VII.42 While a circuit court
splitting decision, Hively followed suit with a growing trend of
district court cases and with the EEOC’s opinion on the issue.43
A. Looking Back: The Historical Debate on Interpreting Sex
Discrimination
Under Title VII, employers cannot discriminate on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.44 However,
when Title VII was enacted, its focus was on race discrimination.45
In fact, sex as a protected class was added to the bill days before it
passed as an attempt to thwart its passing.46 Thus, there was little
41

For further discussion of EEOC’s opinions on sexual orientation
discrimination, see infra notes 82–89 and accompanying text.
42
See Part IV infra notes 99–181 and accompanying text for discussion of
Hively opinion.
43
See Boutillier v. Hartford Pub. Schs., 221 F. Supp. 3d 255, 267-68 (D.
Conn. 2016) (holding that plaintiff has Title VII claim under associational
discrimination and thinks sexual orientation cannot be separated from sex);
see, e.g., U.S. EEOC v. Scott Med. Health Ctr., P.C., 217 F. Supp. 3d 834,
839 (W.D. Pa. 2016) (holding that sex discrimination prohibits
discrimination based on sexual orientation because when asking question
“whether, but for Mr. Baxley’s sex, would he have been subjected to this
discrimination or harassment,” the answer is no); Winstead v. Lafayette
Cnty. Bd. Of Comm’rs, 197 F. Supp. 3d 1334, 1343–46 (N.D. Fla. 2016)
(determining that while sexual orientation discrimination is not necessarily
sex discrimination under EEOC’s argument that sexual orientation cannot
be understood without reference to sex, it is necessarily sex discrimination
under gender stereotype discrimination). But cf. infra notes 82–89 and
accompanying text for EEOC’s reasoning.
44
See supra note 10 (quoting relevant language of Title VII).
45
See Franklin, supra note 2, at 1334 (depicting EEOC’s focus on preparing
for race discrimination cases, but that EEOC was caught off guard when
more than a third of claims were about sex discrimination).
46
See id. at 1317–18 (noting that the proposal to add “sex” to Title VII was
made at last minute, and there was very little discussion on the matter); see
generally 110 Cong. Rec. 2577 (1964) (noting that when Rep. Smith
recommended adding “sex” to Title VII, the legislative debate was almost
over which has been understood as a last-ditch attempt to stop bill). The
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to no discussion about what sex discrimination claims would
entail.47 Regardless, after Title VII’s enactment, there was
significant debate regarding what kind of claims fell under sex
discrimination.48 Legislators, women’s groups, politicians, and the
EEOC all weighed in on what claims sex discrimination covered.49
At the heart of this debate was the effect these claims would have
on traditional sex and family roles.50 This debate influenced how
the EEOC and the courts applied the Title VII sex provision, with
the EEOC eventually expanding sex discrimination to protect
pregnancy discrimination and protective labor legislation, and with
the courts developing jurisprudence that focused on normative
judgments and stereotypes rather than an anti-classification
approach i.e., determining discrimination based on categories not
policy.51
court in Ulane emphasized the fact that the term “sex” was added to Title
VII one day before the House approved the statute in an attempt to stop it.
See Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984)
(describing Title VII’s legislative history and how Congress was concerned
with race discrimination not sex discrimination).
47
Compare Franklin, supra note 2, at 1318–19 (stating that “[t]he
documentary record is meager: one afternoon of debate, no committee
reports or legislative hearings.”), with Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085–86 (detailing
the “total lack of legislative history supporting the sex amendment coupled
with the circumstances of the amendment’s adoption” as proof that
“Congress had a narrow view of sex in mind”), and Eskridge, supra note 36,
at 1489 (noting that Title VII does not define “discriminate” and that “Title
VII was obviously not drafted with a coherent vision of discrimination in
mind . . .”).
48
See generally Franklin, supra note 2, at 1319–54 (highlighting history of
sex discrimination debate including legislator’s opinions, airline’s opinion,
feminist’s opinions, and courts’ opinions during the years after Title VII’s
enactment).
49
See supra note 48 and accompanying text for discussion of historical
debate; see also Franklin, supra note 2, at 1345 (discussing the campaign by
National Organization for Women to redefine sex discrimination).
50
See Franklin, supra note 2, at 1322 (noting that legislators who opposed
adding sex discrimination were afraid that it would regulate traditional sex
and family roles).
51
See id. at 1345 (discussing EEOC’s 1972 guidelines which found that
pregnancy discrimination was sex discrimination and guidelines which
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Despite the ongoing debate into sex stereotypes and social
roles, the “traditional” concept of sex discrimination primarily
took hold in the Supreme Court case Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert,
wherein the Court held that pregnancy discrimination was not
discrimination under Title VII because it did not divide men and
women into separate groups.52 Under this anti-classification
approach, the way to determine if sex discrimination occurred is to
test whether the practice separated employees into a male group or
a female group, with no overlap.53 If so, then there was sex
discrimination.54 After the Gilbert decision, there was little debate
in the courts about how to interpret sex discrimination.55
However, this “traditional” concept of sex discrimination does not
reflect the decades of debate that occurred on what sex
discrimination should cover.56
B. Inching Forward: Supreme Court Expands Title VII
Despite largely following the “traditional” anticlassification approach, the Supreme Court expanded the meaning
found that state protective laws violated Title VII); see also id. at 1354–57
(analyzing cases where courts used comparative method but were actually
relying on normative judgment and social issues). Compare Phillips v.
Martin Marietta Corp, 411 F.2d 1, 4 (5th Cir. 1969) (upholding policy that
barred mothers, but not fathers, with preschool-age children because of “the
differences between the normal relationships of working fathers and
working mothers to their preschool-age children.”), with Sprogis v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971) (asserting that Title VII
is supposed to prevent discrimination “resulting from sex stereotypes” and
to “eliminate...irrational impediments to job opportunities and enjoyment
which have plagued women in the past.”).
52
General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 at 134 (1976); see Franklin,
supra note 2, at 1353 (citing to Gilbert’s holding).
53
See supra note 29 for Franklin’s and Balkin & Siegal’s definition of anticlassification.
54
For Gilbert’s reasoning, see supra note 52 and accompanying text.
55
See Franklin, supra note 2, at 1311 (noting that the “traditional concept”
of sex discrimination “continues to exert a regulative influence over the
law” and makes plaintiffs identify comparators).
56
See id. at 1329–47 (summarizing different arguments about what sex
discrimination covered).
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of sex discrimination to include more than the “traditional”
meaning as exemplified in Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., which
held that “it is unlawful to discriminate against women because
they are women and against men because they are men,” with sex
meaning biologically female or male.57 The Court determined that
sexual harassment, same-sex harassment, and actuarial
assumptions on longevity based on sex are all forms of sex
discrimination.58 Regardless of the strict anti-classification
approach, in Price Waterhouse, the Court found that Title VII
prohibits sex stereotyping.59 There a woman was fired, in part,
because of her aggressive characteristics that some of the partners
viewed as unfeminine.60 She was told to dress and act more
femininely in order to enhance her chances of promotion.61 The
57

Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984).
See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80–82
(1998) (holding that sexual harassment discrimination extends to same-sex
harassment and that the harasser does not need to be homosexual, but rather
the harasser is motivated by hostility to presence of victim’s sex in
workplace); see also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258
(1989) (plurality opinion) (holding that sex discrimination includes failure
to conform to gender stereotypes); see also Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v.
Vinson 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986) (holding that sex discrimination includes
sexual harassment); see also Los Angeles, Dep’t of Water and Power v.
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 715 (1978) (holding that sex discrimination reaches
discrimination based on actuarial assumptions about a person’s longevity).
59
See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250 (plurality opinion) (asserting that
“[i]n saying that gender played a motivating part in an employment
decision, we mean that, if we asked the employer at the moment of the
decision what its reasons were . . . one of those reasons would be that the
applicant or employee was a woman. In the specific context of sex
stereotyping, an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman
cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of
gender.”).
60
For the facts of Price Waterhouse, see infra note 61.
61
See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235 (plurality opinion) (recounting that
one of the partners recommended that she “walk more femininely, talk more
femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and
wear jewelry”). Other partners also used gendered language in her
evaluations. See id. (describing her as “macho” and recommending that she
take “a course in charm school”); see also id. (suggesting that she
58
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Court found that this type of behavior falls under sex
discrimination because “an employer who acts on the basis of a
belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be,
has acted on the basis of gender.”62
C. Getting Closer: Supreme Court’s Understanding of
Sexual Orientation in Constitutional Context
The Supreme Court has also decided sexual orientation
issues in other legal contexts, and, in recent years, the Court has
expanded gay people’s rights.63 In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court
found that a state statute, the Defense Against Marriage Act,
criminalizing homosexual intimacy violated the Due Process
Clause.64 In addition, the Court held that the statute violated Due
Process because its definition of spouse excluded same-sex
partners.65 Most notably, same-sex couples now have the right to
marry.66 According to the Supreme Court, the laws in these cases
“overcompensated for being a woman” and criticizing her use of profanity
which was viewed as more shocking coming from a lady).
62
Id. at 288. See also id. (“An employer who objects to aggressiveness in
women but whose positions require this trait places women in an intolerable
and impermissible catch 22: out of a job if they behave aggressively and out
of a job if they do not.”).
63
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015) (holding that 14th
Amendment protected right to marry as fundamental liberty right); see, e.g.,
United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 770 (2013) (finding that the portion
of Defense of Marriage Act that excluded same-sex partners from “spouse”
definition violated Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses); Lawrence v.
Texas 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (holding that Texas statute criminalizing
homosexual sex violated Due Process Clause).
64
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 585 (2003) (holding that “a law
branding one class of persons as criminal solely based on the State's moral
disapproval of that class and the conduct associated with that class runs
contrary to the values of the Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause,
under any standard of review.”).
65
See Windsor, 570 U.S. at 770 (finding that the portion of Defense of
Marriage Act that excluded same-sex partners from “spouse” definition
violated Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses).
66
See Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2604 (noting that “[t]hese considerations lead
to the conclusion that the right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in
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created inequality because they prevented same-sex couples from
enjoying the same rights as heterosexual couples.67
D. Looking Back: Is Sexual Orientation a Stereotype?:
Circuit Courts’ Confusion Between Stereotypes and
Sexual Orientation
Other courts have struggled and continue to struggle with
distinguishing between sexual orientation discrimination and sex
stereotyping claims.68 While courts recognize this difficulty, their
attempts to draw a line in the sand have created more confusion as
to what type of actions are discriminatory.69 For many courts, the
the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may not be
deprived of that right and that liberty.”).
67
See id. at 2604 (stating that “[t]here is no difference between same- and
opposite-sex couples with respect to this principle. Yet by virtue of their
exclusion from that institution, same-sex couples are denied the
constellation of benefits that the States have linked to marriage. This harm
results in more than just material burdens. Same-sex couples are consigned
to an instability many opposite-sex couples would deem intolerable in their
own lives. As the State itself makes marriage all the more precious by the
significance it attaches to it, exclusion from that status has the effect of
teaching that gays and lesbians are unequal in important respects. It
demeans gays and lesbians for the State to lock them out of a central
institution of the Nation’s society. Same-sex couples, too, may aspire to the
transcendent purposes of marriage and seek fulfillment in its highest
meaning.”).
68
For a further discussion of the confusion courts have experienced in
parsing out the two claims, see infra notes 69–76 and accompanying text.
69
See Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 291 (3rd Cir. 2009)
(“The line between sexual orientation discrimination and discrimination
based on sex can be difficult to draw.”). Courts have tried various ways to
tease apart the two concepts. See Hively v. Ivy Tech. Cmty. Coll. of Ind.,
830 F.3d 698, 705 (7th Cir. 2016) (noting that some courts disallow claims
where sexual orientation and gender non-conformity are together, some bar
all claims from gay/lesbian employees, and others try to separate two types
of claims to focus only on gender non-conformity allegations), rev’d and
remanded, 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017); accord Soucek, supra note 22, at
716 (illustrating that courts have created legal landscape where plaintiffs
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distinguishing factor is how the claim itself is presented.70 If a
claim provides facts that highlight a person’s perceivable gender
non-conformity behavior,71 then it is a sex stereotyping case and
the person’s sexual orientation is not relevant to the legal
argument.72 Courts have identified characteristics such as how one
who “look gay” have claims under Title VII while those who are not
perceived to be homosexual but are known to be so rarely have claims).
70
See infra notes 72–75 and accompanying text (indicating that claims that
highlight sexual orientation facts fail while claims that highlight perceivable
sex stereotype facts are more likely to proceed).
71
See supra note 16 for definition of sex stereotyping. Certain courts use
the phrase “gender non-conformity” as opposed to “sex stereotyping,” but,
for the purposes of this note, they indicate the same situation.
72
Compare Prowel, 579 F.3d at 292 (“Prowel was harassed because he did
not conform to his employer’s vision of how a man should look, speak, and
act – rather than harassment based solely on his sexual orientation. To be
sure, the District Court correctly noted that the record is replete with
evidence of harassment motivated by Prowel's sexual orientation. Thus, it is
possible that the harassment Prowel alleges was because of his sexual
orientation, not his effeminacy. Nevertheless, this does not vitiate the
possibility that Prowel was also harassed for his failure to conform to gender
stereotypes.”). In Prowel, the plaintiff described himself as having “a high
voice and did not curse; was very well-groomed; wore what others would
consider dressy clothes; was neat; filed his nails instead of ripping them off
with a utility knife; crossed his legs and had a tendency to shake his foot
‘the way a woman would sit’; walked and carried himself in an effeminate
manner; drove a clean car; had a rainbow decal on the trunk of his car;
talked about things like art, music, interior design, and decor; and pushed
the buttons on the nail encoder with ‘pizzazz.’” Id. at 287, with Nichols v.
Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001) (“At its essence, the
systematic abuse directed at Sanchez reflected a belief that Sanchez did not
act as a man should act. Sanchez was attacked for walking and carrying his
tray "like a woman" -- i.e., for having feminine mannerisms. Sanchez was
derided for not having sexual intercourse with a waitress who was his
friend. Sanchez's male co-workers and one of his supervisors repeatedly
reminded Sanchez that he did not conform to their gender-based stereotypes,
referring to him as "she" and "her." And, the most vulgar name-calling
directed at Sanchez was cast in female terms. We conclude that this verbal
abuse was closely linked to gender.”), and Reed v. S. Bend Nights, Inc., 128
F. Supp. 3d 996, 998 (E.D. Mich. 2015) (illustrating that certain facts such
as that plaintiff’s employer thought “being gay was disgusting” and that she
did not “feel comfortable with [plaintiff’s] sexuality” support non-actionable
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talks, walks, and dresses as indicative of non-conforming
behavior.73 On the other hand, if a claim only states that
discrimination occurred because of the individual’s sexual
orientation, then it is a sexual orientation case and not actionable.74
Some courts even refuse to look at gender non-conformity cases
when sexual orientation is a factor because they do not want to try
and distinguish the two claims.75 Despite some courts recognizing
sexual orientation claim, while facts like “she acted too manly,” “dressed
more like a male than a female,” and had a “little more mannish” demeanor
support gender non-conformity claim).
73
See supra note 23 for description of gay characteristics. See also supra
note 72 for facts highlighting gay characteristics.
74
Compare Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 264 (3d
Cir. 2001) (holding that plaintiff can only demonstrate same-sex sexual
harassment by showing that harassers were motivated by sexual desire, did
not approve of men in the workplace/job, or harassed because of plaintiff’s
failure to conform to sex stereotypes). Plaintiff’s claim only alleged facts
that he was discriminated because of his sexual orientation and, thus, the
court granted summary judgment for the defendant. Id. at 265, and Hamm
v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., 332 F.3d 1058, 1065 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding
grant of summary judgment in defendant’s favor because “even when
construing all facts and drawing all reasonable inferences in Hamm's favor
and considering Hamm's coworkers' conduct relating to his job performance
in conjunction with their comments regarding his sexual orientation in order
to form the fullest picture, Hamm has failed to make a sufficient showing
that he was harassed because of his sex.”), with Hamner v. St. Vincent
Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701, 703 (7th Cir. 2000) (affirming
magistrate judge’s grant of defendants motion for judgment as a matter of
law because plaintiff’s sexual harassment claim was about his sexual
orientation). The harasser lisped at plaintiff, flipped his wrists, and made
gay jokes. Id., and Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 125 F.3d 408, 412 (7th Cir.
1997) (finding that gay slurs were inadequate to sustain a gender nonconformity claim where plaintiff did not provide evidence that he failed to
conform to stereotypes).
75
See Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 764 (6th Cir. 2006)
(dismissing gender non-conformity claim because it recognized that this
would open door to sexual orientation claims because “[i]n all likelihood,
any discrimination based on sexual orientation would be actionable under a
sex stereotyping theory if this claim is allowed to stand, as all homosexuals,
by definition, fail to conform to traditional gender norms in their sexual
practices.”); cf. Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 37 (2d Cir. 2000)
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claims under gender non-conformity, all of the other circuits have
held that sexual orientation claims do not fall under Title VII.76
This difference between the circuit courts’ Title VII approaches
and the Supreme Court’s approach to sexual orientation adds to the
confusing legal landscape where “a person can be married on
Saturday and then fired on Monday for just that act.”77

(holding that plaintiff cannot bring successful gender non-conformity claim
because “Simonton does not offer direct comparative evidence about how
the alleged harasser treated members of both sexes in [his] mixed-sex
workplace, and does not allege a basis for inferring gender-based animus,
we are unable to infer that the alleged conduct would not have been directed
at a woman.”) (internal quotations omitted).
76
See, e.g., Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259
(1st Cir. 1999) (holding that it is settled law that Title VII does not protect
sexual orientation discrimination); Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d
211, 217 (2d Cir. 2005) (recognizing that a plaintiff cannot bring sexual
orientation discrimination claim under Title VII); Prowel v. Wise Bus.
Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 293 (stating that the plaintiff’s claim was a
repackaging of sexual orientation claim which is not allowed under Title
VII); Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 143 (4th Cir. 1996)
(couching holding in terms of same-sex harassment not sexual orientation
discrimination); Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979)
(stating that employment discharge because employee is gay is not
prohibited under Title VII); Kalich v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 679 F.3d 464,
471 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that harassment based on sexual orientation is
not cognizable claim); Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d
69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989) (stating that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination
against gay persons); De Santis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327,
329 (9th Cir. 1979) (concluding that Title VII should not be extended to
include sexual preference); Medina v. Income Support Div., 413 F.3d 1131,
1135 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that Title VII’s protections do not extend to
cover sexual orientation); Fredette v. BVP Mgmt. Assocs., 112 F.3d 1503,
1510 (11th Cir. 1997) (stating that discrimination because of sexual
orientation is not actionable); see also Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d
1248, 1257 (11th Cir. 2017) (affirming sexual orientation discrimination
case dismissal because of the court’s binding precedent).
77
Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 830 F.3d 698, 714 (7th Cir. 2016),
rev’d and remanded, 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017).
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E. Seventh Circuit’s Reasoning Before Hively
Before Hively, the Seventh Circuit held that Title VII did
not provide a remedy for sexual orientation discrimination.78
However, the Seventh Circuit did recognize the possibility for a
gay person to bring a gender non-conformity claim.79 Regardless,
the court did not allow gay persons to “bootstrap” their sexual
orientation discrimination claims into sex discrimination claims.80
Thus, the court held to the “traditional” concept of sex
discrimination.81
78

See Hamm, 332 F.3d at 1062 (holding that a gay plaintiff failed to show
harassment based on sex and that coworkers’ actions were based on the
plaintiff’s work performance and sexual orientation); see, e.g., Hamner, 224
F.3d at 707 (holding that a gay plaintiff did not have a claim because
harassment was based on sexual orientation); Spearman v. Ford Motor Co.,
231 F.3d 1080, 1087 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding that a gay plaintiff did not
have sex discrimination case because employer did not treat him differently
than female employees).
79
See Spearman, 231 F.3d at 1085 (recognizing that because of Price
Waterhouse, individuals can bring evidence of stereotyping and harassment
but that this evidence must prove sex discrimination); cf. Doe v. City of
Belleville, 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997), (holding that a gay plaintiff had a
Title VII claim because “a man who is harassed because his voice is soft, his
physique is slight, his hair is long, or because in some other respect he
exhibits his masculinity in a way that does not meet his coworker’s idea of
how men are supposed to appear and behave, is harassed ‘because of’ his
sex.”) cert. granted and vacated, 523 U.S. 1001 (1998).
80
For factual situations that failed to satisfy gender non-conformity claim,
see supra note 78.
81
See supra note 78 for Seventh Circuit cases holding to Ulane reasoning;
see also Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1984)
(asserting that sex means "biological male or biological female" and that any
other definition would have to come from Congress). Thus, the court
determined that Congress intended “sex” to be understood as the “traditional
concept of sex.” Id. at 1085. For an argument that Hively itself still
conforms to the “traditional” concept, see generally Brian Soucek, Hively’s
Self-Induced Blindness, 127 YALE L.J.F. 115 (2017) (arguing that all of
Hively opinions focused on form, remaining blind to sex discrimination
substance).
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F. The EEOC’s Response to Courts’ Conflicting Views
A month after Obergefell v. Hodges, where the Supreme
Court held that the right to marry is a fundamental right, and, thus,
same-sex couples could not be deprived of that right, the EEOC
decided Baldwin v. Foxx, where a federal employee argued that his
employer discriminated against him because he is gay.82 The
EEOC recognized the contradictory outcomes in the courts and
decided that the distinction between sexual orientation
discrimination and sex discrimination does not exist.83 The EEOC
determined that there are at least three ways that sexual orientation
discrimination falls under sex discrimination: the comparative
method, associational discrimination, and sex stereotypes.84
Under the comparative method, an employer discriminates
when the treatment of the employee would not have occurred but
for the employee’s sex.85 Under associational discrimination,86 an

82

Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015); See Baldwin v. Foxx,
2015 EEOPUB LEXIS 1905, *3 (E.E.O.C. July 16, 2015) (alleging that the
complainant was not selected for position because he is gay); see also
Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2604–05 (holding that same-sex couples may
exercise the right to marry). See generally Rebecca Hanner White, The
EEOC, The Courts, and Employment Discrimination Policy: Recognizing
the Agency’s Leading Role in Statutory Interpretation, 1995 UTAH L. REV.
51 (1995) (illustrating EEOC’s struggle with interpretive authority because
Title VII did not provide the EEOC with explicit interpretive authority).
83
See Baldwin at *13 (holding that “sexual orientation is inherently a sexbased consideration.”). While the EEOC has held this, the Department of
Justice, in Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 855 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2017),
currently holds the opposing viewpoint. See Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae at 1–2, Zarda v. Altitude Express, 855 F.3d 76 (2d Cir.
2017) (No. 15-3775), 2017 U.S. 2d Cir. Briefs LEXIS 5 (asserting that it is a
settled matter of law that Title VII does not include sexual orientation
discrimination).
84
See Baldwin at *27 (summarizing that an individual can bring sexual
orientation claim under three approaches).
85
See id. at *13 (asserting that when acting based on an individual's sexual
orientation, the employer necessarily takes into account an individual's sex
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employer discriminates when the treatment is based on the sex of
the person with whom the employee associates romantically.87
Under sex stereotyping, an employer discriminates when the
treatment is based on gender assumptions, with sexual orientation
being one of those assumptions.88 Thus, the EEOC held that
sexual orientation discrimination is necessarily sex discrimination
and gives example of comparing lesbian employee having photo of spouse
on desk with male employee displaying female spouse photo).
86
See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that the state
prohibiting interracial marriage violated the principle of equality under 14th
Amendment because it “requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be
restricted by invidious racial discriminations”). The Supreme Court rejected
the idea that the miscegenation laws were not discriminatory because they
punish equally both the white and the African American participants in an
interracial marriage. See id. at 10 (determining that equal application of the
statute is not enough to support keeping miscegenation laws because the
purpose of Fourteenth Amendment is to “eliminate all official state sources
of invidious racial discrimination in the States”). Other circuits have also
extended Loving to Title VII cases. Compare Parr v. Woodmen of World
Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 892 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that a white man
married to a black woman who was denied employment had a claim under
Title VII because “[i]t would be folly for this court to hold that a plaintiff
cannot state a claim under Title VII for discrimination based on an
interracial marriage because, had the plaintiff been a member of the spouse's
race, the plaintiff would still not have been hired.”), and Holcomb v. Iona
Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 132 (2d Cir. 2008) (determining that a white employee
married to a black individual who was fired had claim under Title VII
because “an employer may violate Title VII if it takes action against an
employee because of the employee’s association with a person of another
race.”), with Drake v. Minn, Mining & Mfg. Co., 134 F.3d 878, 884 (7th
Cir. 1998) (noting that the defendant conceded that an “employee can bring
associational discrimination claim under Title VII”).
87
See Baldwin v. Foxx, 2015 EEOPUB LEXIS 1905, *17 (E.E.O.C. July
16, 2015) (taking someone's sex into account and treating them differently
because the employee associates with someone of same sex).
88
See id. at *13 (stating that “[d]iscrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation is premised on sex-based assumptions, expectations, stereotypes,
or norms”); see also id. at 22 (quoting Centola v. Potter, 183 F. Supp. 2d
403, 410 (D. Mass. 2002) (asserting that sexual orientation discrimination is
“often, if not always, motivated by a desire to enforce heterosexually
defined gender norms.”)).
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because sexual orientation is inherently a sex-based consideration
and that gay/lesbian sexual orientation is the ultimate failure to
conform to sex stereotypes.89
III. THROUGH ROSE-COLORED GLASSES: HOW THE VARIOUS
OPINIONS IN HIVELY APPROACHED THE INTERPRETATIVE TASK
In 2000, Kimberly Hively started teaching as a part-time,
adjunct professor at Ivy Tech Community College in South Bend,
Indiana.90 Between 2009 and 2014, she applied to at least six fulltime positions at the college, but failed to receive any of them.91
In July 2014, the college did not renew her part-time contract.92
On December 13, 2013, Hively filed a pro se charge with the
EEOC, arguing that Ivy Tech refused to hire her for the full-time
positions or to renew her contract because of her status as an
openly lesbian woman.93
After exhausting the procedural requirements available to
her through the EEOC, she filed a complaint in the District Court
for the Northern District of Indiana.94 At the district court level,
89

See Baldwin, at *13 (holding that “[i]ndeed, we conclude that sexual
orientation is inherently a ‘sex-based consideration,’ and an allegation of
discrimination based on sexual orientation is necessarily an allegation of sex
discrimination under Title VII.”).
90
See Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 341 (7th Cir.
2017) (stating Hively’s occupation and time at Ivy Tech Community
College).
91
See id. (describing Hively’s attempts to procure full-time position).
92
See id. (stating that “in July 2014, her part-time contract was not
renewed.”).
93
See id. (depicting how Hively filed with EEOC). Her pro se charge only
stated that she had been discriminated against because of her sexual
orientation. See id. (citing pro se charge which stated that “I have applied
for several positions at IVY TECH, fulltime, in the last 5 years. I believe I
am being blocked from fulltime employment without just cause. I believe I
am being discriminated against based on my sexual orientation. I believe I
have been discriminated against and that my rights under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 were violated.”).
94
See id. (recounting that Hively received a right-to-sue letter from EEOC,
which allowed her to sue in federal court). Her complaint provided more
facts on which she based her claim. See Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of

KRALL: ONE TEXT, ANOTHER RENDERING NOW: IN THE WAKE OF HIVELY V. IVY TECH CMTY. COLL. OF
IND., THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE TO DEFINE SEX DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE VII

48

DEPAUL J. WOMEN, GEN & LAW

[Vol. VII: II

Ivy Tech filed a 12(b)(6) motion, arguing that sexual orientation is
not a protected class under Title VII.95 The court granted the
motion and dismissed the case with prejudice.96 Hively appealed,
and, although the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, the
court provided an in-depth analysis of circuit precedent and the
EEOC’s opinion in Baldwin.97 After Hively filed a brief
requesting a rehearing en banc, a majority of judges in regular
active service voted to rehear the case en banc because of this
issue’s importance and to bring the law into conformity with the
Supreme Court’s guidance.98
Ind., 830 F.3d 698, 699 (7th Cir. 2016) (stating that the complaint alleged
that “although she had the necessary qualifications for full-time employment
and had never received a negative evaluation, the college refused to even to
interview her for any of the six full-time positions for which she applied
between 2009 and 2014 . . .”), rev’d and remanded, 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir.
2017).
95
See Hively, 853 F.3d at 341 (recounting the defendant’s argument that
“sexual orientation is not a protected class under Title VII” and the district
court’s decision to grant defendant’s motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ.
Pro. 12(b)(6)); see generally FED. R. CIV. PRO. 12(b)(6) (“failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted”). In a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the
court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party, i.e., Hively. See Hively, 853 F.3d at 345 (noting that the court must
look at the facts in the light most favorable to Hively).
96
See Hively, 853 F.3d at 341 (noting that “relying on a line of this court’s
cases exemplified by Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. and Health Care Ctr.,
Inc., 224 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2000), the district court granted Ivy Tech’s
motion and dismissed Hively’s case with prejudice.”).
97
See id. (affirming the district court’s decision); see also Hively, 830 F.3d
at 709 (holding that while distinguishing between a sex stereotyping claim
and a sexual orientation claim is difficult and can lead to contradictory
results, the distinction is not impossible). The panel did consider the
EEOC’s position but was unwilling to overturn precedent. See id. at 702–
703 (discussing the EEOC’s arguments in Baldwin). Moreover, the panel
believed that only the Supreme Court or new legislation could make sexual
orientation a class under Title VII. See id. at 718 (determining that the
Supreme Court or Congress were the only available avenues of change).
98
See Hively, 853 F.3d at 343 (noting the importance of the issue and
recognizing the power of the full court of appeals to overrule earlier
decisions); see also Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc of
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The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc,
reversed the district court’s decision and remanded it for further
proceedings, holding that discrimination based on sexual
orientation is discrimination based on sex as stated in Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.99 The four opinions in Hively each
focused on determining a particular framework for statutory
interpretation and then utilized that framework to determine what
sex discrimination means.100 Interestingly, each opinion utilizes a
different interpretative approach that leads to a different response
to what sex discrimination means.101 The majority focused on the
EEOC’s arguments and the Supreme Court’s approach to sexual
orientation in the legal landscape.102 Judge Posner, in his
concurrence, posited a somewhat radical interpretive approach,
wherein the court has the power to update old statutes so as to
render them applicable to today’s legal issues.103 Judge Flaum
provides a logically clear and simple approach: one cannot think
Plaintiff at 1, Hively v. Ivy Tech. Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir.
2017) (No. 15-1720) (requesting rehearing en banc).
99
See Hively, 853 F.3d at 351–52 (overruling the previous line of Seventh
Circuit cases and holding that it is impossible to discriminate based on
sexual orientation without discriminating based on sex); see also id. at 345
(stating that under 12(b)(6) motion, the court reviews facts in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party).
100
For discussion of each opinions’ interpretative method and its
application, see infra notes 106–181.
101
See Hively, 853 F.3d at 343 (asserting that the court is not amending
statute but rather determining what discrimination based on sex means,
which is a question of statutory interpretation). Compare id. at 343–44
(determining that when a statute is not plain on its face, the judiciary must
look to broader context and recognize that “statutory prohibitions often go
beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils”); with id. at
352 (Posner, J., concurring) (stating that there are three types of
interpretation and he uses judicial interpretive updating); and id. at 360
(Sykes, J., dissenting) (asserting that the judicial role is to interpret
“statutory language as a reasonable person would have understood it at the
time of enactment.”).
102
For further discussion of the majority’s argument, see infra notes 106–
141 and accompanying text.
103
For further discussion of Judge Posner’s concurring opinion, see infra
notes 142–158 and accompanying text.
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about sexual orientation without taking the individual’s sex into
account.104 Finally, the dissent focused on precedent and the idea
that sex and sexual orientation are distinct categories.105
A. Following in the EEOC’s Footsteps: Majority Finds
Sexual Orientation in Sex Discrimination
The majority found that sexual orientation is a type of sex
discrimination.106 It viewed itself as having the authority and
responsibility of bringing the Seventh Circuit in line with the
Supreme Court’s guidance on sexual orientation.107 The majority
opinion, written by Chief Judge Wood, began its analysis by
noting that the court was not amending the statute but was rather
only interpreting what it means to discriminate because of a
person’s sex.108 For the majority, statutory interpretation begins
with deciding whether the statute is plain on its face; if so, there is
no need to look at secondary sources.109 If not, one can look to the
broader context of the statute, particularly the context at the time

104

For further discussion of Judge Flaum’s concurring opinion, see infra
notes 159–166 and accompanying text.
105
For further discussion of Judge Sykes’s dissenting opinion, see infra
notes 167–181 and accompanying text.
106
See Hively, 853 F.3d at 351 (asserting the “common-sense reality that it
is actually impossible to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation
without discriminating on the basis of sex, persuade us that the time has
come to overrule our previous cases that have endeavored to find and
observe that line.”).
107
See id. at 343 (noting that “[i]n light of the importance of the issue, and
recognizing the power of the full court to overrule earlier decisions and to
bring our law into conformity with the Supreme Court’s guidance, a
majority of the judges in regular actives service voted to rehear this case en
banc.”).
108
See id. (asserting that the court was not amending Title VII, but was only
interpreting the statute and the meaning of word “sex”).
109
See id. (arguing that “[f]ew people would insist that there is a need to
delve into secondary sources if the statute is plain on its face.”).
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of enactment.110 However, for the majority, the context is only
uncontroversial when its meaning is consistent with the
conventional wisdom at the time about the law’s reach.111 The
majority determined that interpretation becomes much more
difficult when the statutory language includes multiple
interpretations and unintended consequences.112 Thus, according
to the majority, while legislative history can highlight that
Congress has rejected certain interpretations, it is notoriously
unreliable.113
Instead of focusing on legislative intent and the statute’s
meaning at the time of enactment, the majority relied on the
logical reasoning in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc.,
where the Court argued that statutes cover not only what Congress
intended but also “reasonably comparable evils.”114 Thus, the
Hively majority followed this interpretative approach, reasoning
that “the fact that enacting Congress may not have anticipated a
particular application of the law cannot stand in the way of
provisions of the law that are not on the books.”115 In fact, the
110

See id. (determining that “[e]ven if it is not pellucid, the best source for
disambiguation is the broader context of the statute that the legislature – in
this case, Congress – passed.”)
111
See id. (concluding that interpreting statute is easy when its meaning
conforms to context at time of enactment).
112
See id. (arguing that interpreting statute becomes much harder when it
extends to situations outside the context at time of enactment).
113
See id. (noting that “[l]egislative history is notoriously malleable. Even
worse is the temptation to try to divine the significance of unsuccessful
legislative efforts to change the law.); see also id. (highlighting that
Congress could have decided to not include sexual orientation for various
other reasons).
114
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75 (1998); see Hively,
853 F.3d at 344 (explaining that “[o]ur interpretive task is guided instead by
the Supreme Court’s approach in the closely related case of Oncale . . .”);
see also id. (quoting Oncale, which states that “statutory prohibitions often
go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparably evils, and it is
ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principle concerns of
our legislators by which we are governed.”). For further discussion of
Oncale, see supra note 58 and accompanying text.
115
Hively, 853 F.3d at 345 (asserting that the meaning of “sex” goes beyond
what Congress intended and towards full scope of word).
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majority noted the Supreme Court had already expanded Title VII
to cover discriminatory situations such as sexual harassment,
actuarial assumptions about a person’s lifespan, and gender nonconformity.116
The majority also looked to Supreme Court decisions that
deal more generally with sexual orientation discrimination in order
to understand the current legal landscape of sexual orientation
issues.117 The majority found that the Supreme Court, in recent
years, has consistently protected individuals discriminated against
because of their sexual orientation.118 From these cases, the
majority opined that there is a growing trend towards protecting
gay persons and recognized that, in doing so, society can provide
greater equality.119
The majority then analyzed plaintiff Hively’s two proposed
approaches to including sexual orientation discrimination under
sex discrimination: the comparative method and associational

116

See id. (listing Supreme Court cases that have expanded the types of
claims under Title VII). For further discussion of these cases, see supra
note 58.
117
See id. at 349 (asserting that “[t]oday’s decision must be understood
against the backdrop of the Supreme Court’s decisions, not only in the field
of employment discrimination, but also in the area of broader discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation.”). See generally id. at 349–50 (detailing
other sexual orientation Supreme Court cases in Part III of opinion).
118
Compare Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 585 (2003) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (holding that the Texas criminal statute violated the liberty of
the Due Process Clause because it criminalized homosexual intimacy); with
United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 769–70 (2013) (finding that the
portion of Defense of Marriage Act that excluded same-sex partners from
the “spouse” definition violated the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses); and Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015) (holding
that the 14th Amendment protected the right to marry as a fundamental
liberty right).
119
See Hively, 853 F.3d at 350–51 (quoting Obergefell to emphasize the
Court’s commitment to sexual orientation equality); see Obergefell, 135
S.Ct. at 2604 (“[i]t is now clear that the challenged laws burden the liberty
of same-sex couples, and it must be further acknowledged that they abridge
central precepts of equality.”).
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discrimination.120 The majority agreed with these approaches and
found them to be valid examples of how sexual orientation
discrimination can fall under Title VII.121 In addition, the court
evaluated the comparative method with the sex stereotyping
reasoning in Price Waterhouse and determined that sexual
orientation claims can also be brought as sex stereotyping
claims.122
i.

The Comparative Method

Under the comparative method, the only variable that
changes in the scenario is the person’s sex to determine if this
change creates a change in the employer’s actions.123 Thus, the
majority asked whether the college would have treated Hively
differently if she was a man, but everything else stayed the same,
notably her partner’s sex.124 If so, then the employer was
discriminating based on sex.125 In Hively’s case, the court
compared Hively as a lesbian with Hively as a heterosexual man
and determined that she would not have been fired if she were a
120

See Hively, 853 F.3d at 345 (noting that “Hively offers two approaches in
support of her contention that “sex discrimination” includes discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation.”).
121
See id. at 344 (arguing for two approaches); see also id. at 345
(concluding that, under the comparative method, the defendant is
discriminating against Hively because she is a woman); see also id. at 349
(illustrating that the associational discrimination theory also works).
122
Id. at 346 (determining that there is no line between gender nonconformity claims and sexual orientation claims).
123
See id. at 345 (stating that the comparative method is where the court
“attempt[s] to isolate the significance of the plaintiff’s sex to the employer’s
decision: has she described a situation in which, holding all other things
constant and changing only her sex, she would have been treated the same
way?”).
124
See id. (noting that the hypothetical would make Hively a male
heterosexual).
125
See id. (stating that “Ivy Tech is disadvantaging her because she is a
woman.”). The majority blends together the gender non-conformity issue
with the comparative method. See also id. at 346 (stating that “Hively
represents the ultimate case of failure to conform to the female stereotype”).
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man.126 Thus, the majority concluded that “Ivy Tech is
disadvantaging her because she is a woman.”127
ii.

Gender Non-Conformity

While the majority started with the comparative method, it
ended up moving from the comparative method to a more nuanced
method that focused on gender non-conformity.128 According to
the majority, there is no difference between a gender nonconformity and a sexual orientation claim.129 The court noted that
attempting to draw a line between the two types of claims has
created contradictory and somewhat absurd results in both the
district and circuit courts.130 A lesbian (and gay persons in
general) represented the “ultimate case of failure to conform to the
female stereotype.”131 In both the situation where a woman was
discriminated against for being too assertive and one where she
was discriminated against for being a lesbian, the employer’s
behavior necessarily had to take the victim’s biological sex into
account.132 The majority reasoned that being heterosexual is just
126

See id. at 345–46 (using the comparative method to determine if sex
discrimination occurred).
127
Id. at 345 (emphasis omitted).
128
See id. at 346 (deciding that there is no distinction between a gender nonconformity claim and a sexual orientation claim); see, e.g., id. (arguing that,
in gender non-conformity cases, employers were deciding what
behaviors/characteristics were acceptable in the job and that sexual
orientation is one such characteristic).
129
See supra note 128 for information on majority’s response to gender
non-conformity. For further discussion of gender non-conformity and
sexual orientation, see infra notes 131–135 and accompanying text.
130
See Hively, 853 F.3d at 350 (noting that to remove sex from sexual
orientation creates contradictory results); see supra notes 68–77 and
accompanying text for a discussion on the differing district court
approaches.
131
Id. at 346 (stating that “Hively represents the ultimate case of failure to
conform to the female stereotype”).
132
See id. (stating that sexual orientation discrimination is based on
assumptions about the correct behavior for someone of particular sex); see
also id. at 347 (“The discriminatory behavior does not exist without taking
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one of the many sex stereotypes, i.e., where an employer assumes
that the acceptable behavior of a woman is that she be attracted to
men.133 Even before Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court and
the Seventh Circuit had allowed claims where women were
discriminated at work for resisting stereotypical roles.134 Thus, the
court concluded that sexual orientation is the ultimate failure to
conform to sex stereotypes since the proper behavior is for Hively,
as a woman, to be sexually attracted to men.135
iii.

Associational Discrimination

The majority found that the associational discrimination
approach to sex discrimination also protected against sexual
orientation discrimination.136 Under an associational
discrimination approach, the issue is whether the discrimination
would occur if Hively’s partner’s sex was changed.137 This

the victim’s biological sex . . . into account. Any discomfort, disapproval,
or job decision based on the fact that the complainant – woman or man –
dresses differently, speaks differently, or dates or marries a same-sex
partner, is a reaction purely and simply based on sex.”).
133
See id. at 346 (noting that, in the United States, heterosexuality is norm
and, thus, any other sexuality is not normal).
134
See id. (highlighting two circuit court cases where female stereotypical
roles were at issue). Compare Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S.
543, 544 (1971) (holding that an employer cannot refuse to hire women with
pre-school age children who hires men with pre-school age children), with
Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971)
(striking down the employment regulation that required airline stewardesses
to be unmarried).
135
See Hively, 853 F.3d at 346 (stating that sexual orientation discrimination
is founded on behavioral assumptions of what is “proper” for someone of
particular sex).
136
See id. at 349 (holding that associational discrimination applies to sex
discrimination cases and applies in this case).
137
See id. at 347 (stating that “[i]t is now accepted that a person who is
discriminated against because of the protected characteristic of one with
whom she associates is actually being disadvantaged because of her own
traits.”); see also id. at 349 (noting that “if we were to change the sex of one
partner in a lesbian relationship, the outcome would be different. This
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approach comes from Loving and its line of cases where interracial
couples were discriminated against.138 While in those cases the
claim was constitutional in nature, the majority argued that
associational discrimination is also applicable under Title VII.139
The majority then asserted that, since one can bring a race
associational discrimination claim, then one can bring a sex
associational discrimination claim because Title VII does not
distinguish between the different discriminatory categories; thus,
an argument made in race discrimination cases can be applied in
sex discrimination cases.140 Therefore, the majority held that
sexual orientation discrimination can be considered a sex
associational discrimination claim because “[i]f we were to change
the sex of one partner in a lesbian relationship, the outcome would
be different” which “reveals that the discrimination rests on
distinctions drawn according to sex.”141
B. Get with the Times: Judge Posner’s Concurring Opinion
Arguing for Judiciary to Update Statutes
According to Judge Posner in his concurring opinion,
judges should reevaluate the meaning of statutes like Title VII so
reveals that the discrimination rests on distinctions drawn according to
sex.”).
138
See id. at 347 (highlighting the line of cases that extended discrimination
protection to both partners). For further discussion of Loving, see supra
note 86.
139
See Hively, 853 F.3d at 347–48 (citing to circuits that have extended race
associational discrimination to Title VII cases). For further discussion of
cases that extended associational discrimination to Title VII, see supra note
86.
140
See Hively, 853 F.3d at 349 (noting that Title VII does not draw
distinction between different types of discrimination, and, therefore, the
courts can use race arguments in sex context); see also Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244, n.9 (1989) (plurality opinion) (determining that
Title VII treats each of the categories exactly the same); cf. Hively, 853 F.3d
at 349 (asserting that “[i]f we were to change the sex of one partner in a
lesbian relationship, the outcome would be different. This reveals that the
discrimination rests on distinctions drawn according to sex.”).
141
Hively, 853 F.3d at 349.
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that the statutes remain relevant.142 Judge Posner argued that there
are three ways to interpret statutes.143 The last of these options is
“judicial interpretive updating,” which he defined as, when the
judiciary gives new meaning to a statute so that the statute has
modern significance.144
For Judge Posner, judicial interpretive updating only
comes into play when a lengthy amount of time has passed since
the statute’s enactment.145 Judge Posner highlighted various other
situations where “[s]tatutes and constitutional provisions
frequently are interpreted on the basis of present need and present
understanding rather than the original meaning.”146 Judge Posner
drew on the interpretative method in Missouri v. Holland, where
Justice Holmes stated that “[w]e must consider what this country
has become in deciding what that amendment has reserved.”147
142

See id. at 355 (Posner, J., concurring) (emphasizing that the failure to
adopt judicial updating would render Title VII anachronistic).
143
See id. at 352 (Posner, J., concurring) (indicating that there are three
approaches to statutory interpretation: the original meaning of the statute as
understood by legislators, unexpressed intent, and the new meaning that
applies to today’s situations). The first is the meaning intended by the
legislators in connection with how the word is interpreted in everyday
language. See id. (describing this approach as the most conventional and
easy to determine). The second is interpretation by unexpressed intent
where, for example, an ordinance states “no vehicles in the park” but it is
understood that this does not apply to an ambulance. See id. (quoting
William Blackstone, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 59–60
(1765) where Blackstone argued that “where words bear either none, or a
very absurd signification, if literally understood, we must a little deviate
from the received sense of them.”).
144
See Hively, 853 F.3d at 352 (Posner, J., concurring) (alleging that Title
VII “invites an interpretation that will update it to the present, a present that
differs markedly from the era in which the Act was enacted.”).
145
See id. at 353 (Posner, J., concurring) (emphasizing that this approach
“presupposes a lengthy interval between enactment and (re)interpretation.”).
146
Id. at 352 (Posner, J., concurring).
147
See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433–34 (1920) (arguing that
“[t]he case before us must be considered in the light of our whole
experience and note merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago . . .
. We must consider what this country has become in deciding what the
amendment has reserved.”).
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In Judge Posner’s opinion, society’s understanding of sex
has changed dramatically.148 As he stated, “today ‘sex’ has a
broader meaning than the genitalia you’re born with.”149 He then
discussed how society’s understanding of sexual orientation has
changed, noting that, today, we understand that homosexuality150
is “biological and innate, not a choice.”151 Thus, being
discriminated against for being a lesbian and being discriminated
against for being a woman are analogous situations because there
is no choice.152 For Judge Posner, there was no difference
between the two situations because “homosexuality is nothing
worse than failing to fulfill stereotypical gender roles.”153 Judge
Posner admitted that this is a loose interpretation of “sex” but
views this as justifiable because of the social policy to protect gay
persons.154 Thus, today’s use of the word “sex” connotes both
gender and sexual orientation.155 According to Judge Posner, this
can be viewed as the natural progression of ideas from sexual
harassment to gender non-conformity to sexual orientation.156 He
148

See Hively, 853 F.3d at 354 (Posner, J., concurring) (providing a brief
history of how society’s understanding of sex has changed, notably how sex
no longer is just about the biological genitalia with which one is born).
149
Id. (Posner, J., concurring).
150
I utilize the term “homosexuality” here because Judge Posner used it
within his opinion. See id. at 355 (Posner, J., concurring) (utilizing the term
“homosexuality” to describe lesbian and gay male sexual orientation).
151
Id. at 354 (Posner, J., concurring); see also id. (Posner, J., concurring)
(noting the developments in the scientific understanding of sexual
orientation).
152
See id. at 355–56 (Posner, J., concurring) (arguing that the type of
discrimination is analogous).
153
Id. at 355 (Posner, J., concurring).
154
See id. (Posner, J., concurring) (declaring that the broader interpretation
of “sex” is necessary because gay persons need to be protected since they
are now considered to be “normal in the ways that count”).
155
See id. at 353 (Posner, J., concurring) (concluding this to be true).
156
See id. at 355 (Posner, J., concurring) (depicting how it took time for
society to appreciate that sexual harassment was form of sex discrimination,
it has taken even longer to view gender non-conformity as sex
discrimination, and has taken still longer to realize that sexual orientation is
sex discrimination).
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was, however, reluctant to rely on the majority’s use of Oncale
and Loving, arguing that Oncale was still too limiting to allow
sexual orientation discrimination, and Loving was inapposite
because it concerned race and constitutional issues.157 He
concluded by highlighting that the judiciary frequently performs
judicial interpretative updating so as to lessen the burden on the
legislative branch to update statutes, and that it is the judiciary’s
role to utilize the social changes, since Title VII’s enactment, in
order to update the statute to modern times.158
C. “SEX”ual Orientation: Judge Flaum’s Concurrence
Argues Sexual Orientation Necessarily Involves Thinking
About Person’s Sex
Judge Flaum agreed with the majority’s discussion of the
comparative method, gender non-conformity, and associational
discrimination.159 However, he approached interpreting “sex” in a
different manner.160 He argued that “discrimination against an
employee on the basis of their homosexuality is necessarily, in
part, discrimination based on their sex” because homosexuality is
the sexual attraction to persons of the same sex.161 Thus, one has
157

See id. at 355–56 (Posner, J., concurring) (commenting that Oncale does
not really help to expand the interpretive framework and Loving is a
constitutional case on race).
158
See id. at 357 (Posner, J., concurring) (asserting that the courts can
update statutes so that the entire burden in not placed on Congress, and
recognizing that judges understand the meaning of “sex” differently today
because they live in a different time with a different culture).
159
See id. (Flaum, J., concurring) (joining Parts I and II of the majority
opinion).
160
See generally id. at 358 (Flaum, J., concurring) (arguing that sex is
fundamental to thinking about sexual orientation).
161
See id. (Flaum, J., concurring) (citing to various dictionary definitions of
“homosexual” including Homosexual, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY
ONLINE, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/homosexual;
Homosexual, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); and Homosexual,
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1964)). Homosexual is also defined
as “of, relating to, or characterized by sexual desire for a person of the same
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to take into account an individual’s sex in order to understand the
individual’s sexual orientation.162 Judge Flaum separated the
discriminatory action into discrimination because of “(A) the
employee’s sex, and (B) their sexual attraction to individuals of
the same sex.”163
According to Judge Flaum, since sex is evidentially a
factor, the issue is whether Title VII requires the discrimination to
occur solely because of sex.164 The statute itself states that the
enumerated trait only has to be a “motivating factor for an
employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the
practice.”165 Therefore, all that Hively must show to bring a Title
VII claim is that the discrimination occurred because she is a
woman who is sexually attracted to women.166

sex. Homosexual, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis
added).
162
See Hively, 853 F.3d at 358 (Flaum, J., concurring) (asserting that “[o]ne
cannot consider a person’s homosexuality without also accounting for their
sex: doing so would render ‘same’ and ‘own’ meaningless.”).
163
Id. (Flaum, J., concurring).
164
See id. (Flaum, J., concurring) (raising the question “[d]oes Title VII’s
text require a plaintiff to show that an employer discriminated against them
solely ‘because of’ an enumerated trait?”).
165
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2017)
(stating that there is an unlawful employment practice when sex is “a
motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors
also motivated the practice”); see also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490
U.S. 228, 241–42 (1989) (determining that ‘because of’ does not mean
‘solely because of,’ and, thus, there can be mixture of legitimate and
illegitimate reasons for employment practice).
166
See Hively, 853 F.3d at 359 (Flaum, J., concurring) (holding that this is
all the employee must show to bring a claim).
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D. I Know Sex When I See It: Judge Sykes’s Categorical
Approach to Sex and Sexual Orientation
Like the majority, the dissent viewed the issue as one of
statutory interpretation.167 However, Judge Sykes believed the
appropriate interpretive mode was to ask how a “reasonable person
would have understood it when it was adopted.”168 Therefore, the
judiciary could not instill new meaning into the statute or update it
to current conditions.169 In addition, precluding sexual orientation
from sex discrimination has been broadly accepted in the federal
courts for many years.170 Moreover, Congress has refused to
include sexual orientation in Title VII, while adding it into other
statutes.171 While there is debate in the public sphere, Judge Sykes
believed that this debate has no place in statutory interpretation,
which is an objective inquiry.172
Using the comparative method, the dissent argued that the
correct comparator is a gay male not a heterosexual one.173 Under
167

See id. at 360 (Sykes, J., dissenting) (noting the “question before the en
banc court is one of statutory interpretation.”).
168
Id. (Sykes, J., dissenting); see also id. at 362 (Sykes, J., dissenting)
(asserting that the original public meaning decides statutory meaning and
asks the rhetorical question of “[i]s it even remotely plausible that in 1964,
when Title VII was adopted, a reasonable persons competent in the English
language would have understood that a law banning employment
discrimination ‘because of sex’ also banned discrimination because of
sexual orientation? The answer is no, of course not.”). She adopted this
position in large part because of the Constitution’s requirement of
bicameralism and presentment. See id. at 360 (Sykes, J., dissenting)
(emphasizing that statutory modification by the judiciary circumvents
bicameralism and presentment, and claiming that this is why the textualist
approach is best).
169
Id. at 360 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
170
Id. at 361 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
171
See id. at 363–64 (Sykes, J., dissenting) (highlighting other statutes that
do mention sexual orientation discrimination so as to argue that Congress
did not intend to protect sexual orientation in Title VII).
172
See id. at 361 (Sykes, J., dissenting) (remarking that society’s
understanding of gay rights has changed dramatically since Title VII was
adopted).
173
Id. at 366–67 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
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the majority’s comparator, both sex and sexual orientation change,
not just the sex variable; thus, in Hively’s scenario, she not only
becomes a man but also a heterosexual.174 For Judge Sykes,
sexual orientation and sex are two distinct categories that are
unrelated to each other.175
Under the associational discrimination approach, the
dissent argued that the miscegenation laws’ purpose was to
support white supremacy.176 Since sexual orientation
discrimination does not aim to maintain the superiority of one sex,
the discrimination is not inherently sexist.177 Thus, the Loving line
of cases does not support merging sex and sexual orientation.178
For the gender non-conformity approach, Judge Sykes
asserted that Price Waterhouse did not create a separate theory to
prove sex discrimination.179 Rather, sex stereotyping can be
evidence of sex discrimination, but there must still be proof that
the employer relied on the employee’s sex.180 For the dissent,
sexual orientation is not a sex-specific stereotype, and, thus, is
unrelated to sex stereotyping.181
174

Id. at 345. But cf. id. at 365 (Sykes, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that
comparative method is a technique for evaluating evidence of plaintiff’s
allegation, not for evaluating legal questions).
175
Id. at 363 (Sykes, J., dissenting); see id. at 365 (stating that “[s]exism . . .
homophobia are separate kinds of prejudice that classify people in distinct
ways based on different immutable characteristics.”).
176
See id. at 368 (Sykes, J., dissenting) (arguing that antimiscegenation laws
are “premised on invidious ideas about white superiority and use racial
classifications toward the end of racial purity and white supremacy . . . . No
one argues that sexual-orientation discrimination aims to promote or
perpetuate the supremacy of one sex.”).
177
Id. (Sykes, J., dissenting).
178
Id. (Sykes, J., dissenting).
179
Id. at 369 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
180
See id. (Sykes, J., dissenting) (quoting Price Waterhouse wherein court
stated that employer had to actually rely on gender when doing employment
practice).
181
See id. at 370 (Sykes, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that “[s]exual
orientation discrimination does not classify people according to invidious or
idiosyncratic male or female stereotypes. It does not spring from a sexspecific bias at all.”).
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IV. OURS IS NOT TO REASON WHY: CRITIQUING HIVELY’S
ANTI-CLASSIFICATION APPROACH AS PROMOTING RATHER
THAN PREVENTING SEX DISCRIMINATION
Instead of encouraging the dynamic interpretation that
occurred before Gilbert, Hively clung to the “traditional” concept,
preventing the much-needed discussion of how to interpret sex
discrimination in today’s social context from occurring.182 Under
the anti-classification approach, the courts lost the dynamic
approach based on social policy and gender stereotypes.183
Moreover, they forgot how important the struggle to understand
sex discrimination was to promoting changes in the normative
roles of men and women.184
182

See Franklin, supra note 2, at 1366–70 (describing how even though
Gilbert was overruled by Congress amending Title VII to include pregnancy
discrimination, the Gilbert test lives on).
183
See id. at 1316 (asserting that, in Gilbert, “[t]alk of deference to the
legislature and fidelity to tradition replaced discussion of the need to
preserve the traditional family and women’s role within it.”); see also
Soucek, supra note 81, at 116 (arguing that Hively decision resulted in “a
gender-blind approach to equality closer to that of the conservative anticlassificationists on the Supreme Court than to the Justices who have thus
far voted for LGBT rights.”).
184
See Franklin, supra note 2, at 1348 (noting that this approach emerged
during the debate about airline stewardess employment practices); see also
id. at 1313–14 (summarizing argument that sex discrimination’s meaning
was uncertain during 60s and 70s and multiple entities voiced various
opinions on issue). Compare id. at 1352 (noting that airlines used anticlassification approach to limit the reach of sex discrimination so that they
could regulate the age and marital status of stewardesses, but the approach
was couched in homemaking and childrearing terms not formal logic), with
id. at 1356 (citing the EEOC’s determination that airline policies were
discriminatory because they were based on assumptions about married
women that limited women’s access to the workplace). But see id. at 1359
(highlighting that Gilbert rejected analysis based on normative
considerations and determined that it was bound to traditional concept since
the court is interpreter not creator of law).

KRALL: ONE TEXT, ANOTHER RENDERING NOW: IN THE WAKE OF HIVELY V. IVY TECH CMTY. COLL. OF
IND., THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE TO DEFINE SEX DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE VII

64

DEPAUL J. WOMEN, GEN & LAW

[Vol. VII: II

By forgetting that history, the Hively opinion attempted to
fit sexual orientation into the anti-classification form.185 In doing
so, it created a logically inconsistent reasoning wherein the court
produced the outcome it wanted, i.e., sexual orientation
discrimination under sex discrimination, but used the formalist
framework.186 Thus, Hively is not as groundbreaking as originally
thought because all of the opinions utilized the same anticlassification framework that historically prevented sex
discrimination claims that failed the comparator test from being
brought, including sexual orientation discrimination claims.187
185

See Soucek, supra note 81, at 115 (arguing that Hively opinions “show
how little judges’ views on statutory interpretation matter when they are
blind to substance” and noting that the opinions fail to cite to one gender
theorist, gay rights advocate, etc.); see also Franklin, supra note 2 at 1312
(determining that the anti-classification approach to sex discrimination, i.e.,
the “traditional concept” of sex discrimination is a legal fiction that does not
represent the interpretive history of the term).
186
See Soucek, supra note 81, at 118 (showing that the majority’s
comparative method fails to satisfy formal logic because it is unclear who
the comparator should be and a heterosexual male comparator does not
separate groups by sex). See generally id. at 115 (depicting how Hively
opinions used the anti-classification approach, and yet failed to meet its
logical requirements). For further discussion of how the majority relies on
but ultimately fails the comparator test, see infra notes 191–203 and
accompanying text. See also Soucek, supra note 81, at 118–19 (noting that
the gender non-conformity argument also fails the formal logic approach
because both men and women violate heterosexual norms). For further
discussion of gender non-conformity issues in Hively, see infra notes 207–
221 and accompanying text. See also id. at 119 (highlighting that the
associational discrimination approach is really just a type of comparator
argument and thus also fails the anti-classification argument). For further
discussion of associational discrimination approach in Hively, see infra
notes 204–206 and accompanying text.
187
See Soucek, supra note 81, at 116 (concluding that the Hively opinions
are blind to sex discrimination’s normative principles and that they
promulgate the anti-classification approach); see also Goldberg, supra note
37, at 733–39 (noting that the use of comparator test has constricted the idea
of discrimination and explains three discrimination theories that have not
gained “jurisprudential traction because the problems they identify cannot,
in effect, be seen by courts”); cf. Soucek, supra note 22, at 768–70
(detailing rhetoric of blindness in antidiscrimination law and how only
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A. Using the Gilbert Hermeneutic Approach: Comparative
and Associational Discrimination Methods
In attempting to conform to the anti-classification
approach, the Seventh Circuit tried to produce a result that
promotes our society’s changing views on sex, gender, and sexual
orientation, while also trying to base that result in formal logic.188
Couching the decision within the traditionally accepted framework
of interpretation allowed the court to retain judicial legitimacy
through the use of formal logic that identifies clear and definable
categories, while avoiding a result based on complex sociological
judgments.189 The court’s attempt to force a new result out of an
old framework creates logical fallacies, as seen with the
comparator and associational discrimination method.190
The comparative method is the straight application of the
“traditional” concept of sex discrimination, i.e., the anticlassification approach.191 This method attempts to separate
individuals into mutually exclusive male/female groups.192 The
protecting perceivable gay persons strengthens the conception that gay
persons are “different”).
188
See Soucek, supra note 81, at 116 (concluding that, while Hively’s result
is a success for LGBT rights, its reasoning failed to note important changes
in scholarship and advocacy that led to court’s decision); see also infra
notes 191–206 and accompanying text for discussion of Hively’s use of anticlassification approach.
189
Goldberg, supra note 37, at 740.
190
See infra notes 191–206 and accompanying text for argument that Hively
approaches create logically inconsistent results.
191
Compare Franklin, supra note 2, at 1311 (arguing that, under the
traditional concept of sex discrimination, “[c]ourts hold that only by
demonstrating that such comparators were not subject to the same adverse
treatment can plaintiffs prove it was their biological sex that triggered the
alleged discrimination.”), with Eskridge, supra note 36, at 1479
(highlighting that the traditional statutory interpretative approach focuses on
Congressional intent at time of enactment and that “[p]revailing approaches
to statutory interpretation treat statutes as static texts.”).
192
See supra notes 123–127 and accompanying text for a discussion of
majority’s comparative method. Compare Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll.
of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 345 (7th Cir. 2017) (depicting the comparative
method as holding all other variables equal except sex), with Franklin, supra
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majority believed that the correct comparator to a lesbian was a
heterosexual male.193 In doing so, Ivy Tech’s sexual orientation
discrimination does separate Hively into the female group, and,
thus, sex discrimination occurred.194
However, in the end, Judge Sykes is the only judge whose
reasoning accurately corresponds to the conclusion.195 The dissent
argued that the correct comparator to a lesbian is a gay male
because only the person’s sex can change.196 For Judge Sykes, the
formal logic approach dictates that there is only sex discrimination
if the discriminatory practice separates employees along biological
sex lines.197 Since sexual orientation is a sex-neutral trait, men
and women are not separated into two separate groups, and,
therefore, sex discrimination has not occurred.198 The dissent’s
comparator falls more squarely within how courts have used the
anti-classification approach, especially since it reinforces
traditional concepts of sex.199
note 2, at 1311 (noting that plaintiffs needed to produce opposite
comparators, i.e., “individuals who are similarly situated to themselves in all
salient respects aside from biological sex” in order to bring a successful sex
discrimination claim).
193
See supra note 126 and accompanying text (stating that the correct
comparator is a heterosexual male).
194
See supra note 127 and accompanying text (asserting that the
discriminatory action did separate on the basis of sex).
195
Compare supra notes 173–175 and accompanying text (determining,
according to dissent, that the correct comparator is a gay man not
heterosexual one), with Franklin, supra note 2, at 1363 (announcing that the
traditional concept of sex discrimination applies only to situations where
practices divide men and women into exclusive groups and that Gilbert
“constructed a history and a pedigree for this idea, suggesting that courts
had no choice but to interpret Title VII’s prohibitions of sex discrimination
in a narrow, formalistic, manner if they wished to remain faithful to the
American legal tradition.”).
196
See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
197
For further discussion of the dissent’s argument, see supra notes 167–
181 and accompanying text.
198
Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 370 (7th Cir. 2017)
(Sykes, J., dissenting).
199
See Franklin, supra note 2, at 1380 (concluding that the traditional
concept of sex discrimination continues to serve its original purpose, i.e.,
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Regardless, there is nothing to suggest that the majority’s
comparator is not equally valid.200 Rather, the majority failed to
provide an argument for why a heterosexual man was a more apt
comparator than a gay man.201 Instead of explaining its reasoning,
the majority immediately shifted to discussing gendernonconformity.202 Thus, under the anti-classification approach, as
understood in Gilbert, sexual orientation discrimination is not sex
discrimination, and the majority did not provide any explanation as
to why the comparator’s sexual orientation should change.203
Under the associational discrimination theory, the majority
made a very similar argument to the comparative method because
it still separated the partners into mutually exclusive sex-specific
groups.204 Consequently, the logic is the same as under the
comparator method but with the added dimension that the partner,
not the employee, is a member of the protected class.205 So, just as
limiting sex discrimination’s reach, but that the loss of normative arguments
prevents ongoing debate into sex discrimination’s interpretation). Compare
supra notes 173–175 and accompanying text (determining, according to the
dissent, that the correct comparator is a gay man not heterosexual one), with
General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 136 (1976) (arguing that there is
no applicable comparator for there is “no question of excluding a disease or
disability comparable in all other respects to covered diseases or disabilities
and yet confined to the members of one race or sex.”).
200
Soucek, supra note 81, at 118.
201
See Hively, 853 F.3d at 345 (concluding that the comparator is a
heterosexual man without explaining why sex and sexual orientation may
change). For Soucek’s thoughts on determining the comparator, see supra
note 200 and accompanying text.
202
See Hively, 853 F.3d at 346 (shifting to gender non-conformity
perspective while still discussing the comparative method); see also Soucek,
supra note 81, at 118–19 (alleging that the majority includes two more
reasons for including sexual orientation discrimination because the
comparative method lacks weight).
203
For further discussion of this conclusion, see supra notes 191–202.
204
See Soucek, supra note 81, at 119 (emphasizing that the associational
discrimination approach still requires a comparator that divides employees
into two mutually exclusive groups along sex lines). See generally supra
notes 136–141 for majority’s approach to associational discrimination.
205
Soucek, supra note 81, at 119. Under race associational discrimination,
the white partner in an interracial marriage is discriminated against for
having an African-American partner. Thus, it is discriminatory against the
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with the comparative method, the comparator could either be a gay
or heterosexual man, which still leaves the problem of who is the
correct comparator.206
B. Taking the Plunge: Sex Stereotyping/Gender NonConformity Approach as Potential New Framework
To truly protect against sexual orientation discrimination,
the court needed to discuss the development in societal
conceptions of sexual orientation to a point where scholars now
recognize the inherent connections between sexual orientation
discrimination and sex discrimination.207 The majority almost
took the leap to view sex discrimination from a social logic
perspective as opposed to a formal logic approach but failed to
take the ultimate steps.208 Following the dynamic statutory
interpretation methodology, the majority recognized the need to
look at the textual and historical aspects of the Title VII but found
those perspectives did not provide a clear answer to defining sex
discrimination.209 The final step the court should have taken is to
move towards an evolutive perspective wherein the court analyzes
the statute in light of “its present context, especially the ways in
white partner because, if he was black, then the discriminatory practice
would not have occurred. Cf. id. (explaining that if partner had been black
rather than white, then discrimination would not have occurred because it
would not be interracial marriage).
206
Compare supra notes 123–127 and accompanying text (discussing the
majority’s comparator), with supra notes 173–175 and accompanying text
(discussing the dissent’s comparator).
207
Compare Soucek, supra note 81, at 121 (emphasizing that Hively
mentioned no gender or queer theory scholarship which highlights the
connection between sexual orientation discrimination and the subordination
of women), with Franklin, supra note 2, at 1379–80 (noting it is legal fiction
to think that Title VII could only be interpreted via the anti-classification
approach and that any other approach would be judicial activism since anticlassification approach was used in order to reinforce traditional gender
norms and sexual conventions).
208
Soucek, supra note 81, at 125–26.
209
See supra notes 108–113 and accompanying text (recounting the Hively
majority’s reasoning).
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which the societal and legal environment of the statute has
materially changed over time.”210 While the court almost took this
final step in discussing gender non-conformity, the court still
included the comparator and associational discrimination
approaches as possible ways to include sexual orientation
discrimination.211 Moreover, the majority’s discussion of gender
non-conformity was conclusory and decidedly lacking in analysis
to back up the conclusions.212
The majority asserted that being a lesbian is the “ultimate
case of failure to conform to the female stereotype,” and decided
to erase the line between gender non-conformity and sexual
orientation claims.213 However, the court framed the female
stereotype as “be straight,” which is a sex-neutral trait.214 Thus, on
its face, both gay men and lesbians can violate the gender norm of
“be straight,” indicating that the trait would fail the comparator
approach.215 Instead of changing the framework to a dynamic
approach, the majority chose to manipulate the anti-classification

210

Eskridge, supra note 36, at 1483.
See supra notes 123–127 and notes 136–141 and accompanying text
(determining that the comparator and associational discrimination
approaches found sexual orientation discrimination was sex discrimination).
212
See supra notes 128–135 and accompanying text for majority’s
discussion of gender non-conformity. But see Soucek, supra note 81, at 116
(noting that the majority is blind to substance, i.e. gender and queer theory
scholarship, which has led the majority to conclude that sexual orientation
discrimination is a part of sex discrimination).
213
Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 346 (7th Cir.
2017). For majority’s discussion of gender non-conformity, see supra notes
128–135 and accompanying text.
214
Hively, 853 F.3d at 346; see also Soucek, supra note 81, at 118–19
(arguing that, since heterosexuality is a stereotype that can apply to both
men and women, it is not a sex-specific trait); cf. Hively, 853 F.3d at 370
(Sykes, J., dissenting) (determining that “[s]exual orientation discrimination
does not classify people according to invidious or idiosyncratic male or
female stereotypes. It does not spring from a sex-specific bias at all.”).
215
For discussion of how heterosexuality is not sex-specific, see supra note
214; see also note 29 for the definition of the anti-classification approach.
211

KRALL: ONE TEXT, ANOTHER RENDERING NOW: IN THE WAKE OF HIVELY V. IVY TECH CMTY. COLL. OF
IND., THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE TO DEFINE SEX DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE VII

70

DEPAUL J. WOMEN, GEN & LAW

[Vol. VII: II

approach so that it worked with the majority’s desire to include
sexual orientation as sex discrimination.216
Judge Posner exhibited a willingness to change how courts
approached sex discrimination but failed to provide sex
discrimination with the necessary foundation in social logic.217 He
analogized Title VII with the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, which has
been interpreted so as to conform with the relevant economic
theories.218 He used this analogy to promote updating Title VII
but did not provide any guidance on what the new framework
would be.219 Instead of discussing possible frameworks grounded
in gender and queer theory, he concluded that society now
understands that gay persons are “normal in the ways that
count.”220 While his judicial interpretive updating could have
brought social and normative arguments into interpreting sex
discrimination, his reasoning, like that of the majority, concluded

216

See Soucek supra note 81, at 125 (arguing that the Hively opinions make
the same errors as the textualist/originalist approach because it “fails to
observe fully the social realities that give Title VII’s words their meaning.”);
cf. Eskridge, supra note 36, at 1482 (arguing that “[i]nterpretation is not
static, but dynamic. Interpretation is not an archeological discovery, but a
dialectical creation. Interpretation is not mere exegesis to pinpoint historical
meaning, but hermeneutics to apply that meaning to current problems and
circumstances.”).
217
See Soucek, supra note 81, at 126 (describing Judge Posner’s opinion as
“candid and provocative,” but maintaining that it also exhibits “a blindness
to the sex-specific ways that gender stereotypes involving sexual orientation
actually operate in the contemporary world.”).
218
Hively, 853 F.3d at 352 (Posner, J., concurring).
219
See Soucek, supra note 81, at 128 (arguing that Judge Posner’s Title VII
updated interpretation stems from his own change in attitude to sexual
orientation).
220
Compare Hively, 853 F.3d at 355 (Posner, J., concurring) (concluding
that gay persons “play an essential role” in country and there is social
interest in protecting them), with Soucek, supra note 81, at 127–28 (arguing
that Judge Posner relies on his own personal changes in understanding
sexual orientation as opposed to relying on scholars who study “the
dynamics of sexual orientation, gender-based stereotyping, and
subordination”).
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that sexual orientation falls under sex discrimination but failed to
tell us why.221
With judicial interpretive updating, Judge Posner needed to
take the final step and provide his method with substance.222 By
engaging with social science theories on sex, gender, and sexual
orientation, the court could take Price Waterhouse to its next
natural progression: viewing sexual orientation discrimination as a
form of sex stereotyping.223 As one commentator on Price
Waterhouse noted, the Court easily saw the connection between
sex discrimination and the statements calling the female partner
“too macho.”224 What the Court failed to realize was why that link
was easy to make.225 It was easy to make because the justices
221

See Soucek, supra note 81, at 128 (commenting that Judge Posner did
not stick to his analogy and should have looked “to those who have spent
their careers studying the dynamics of sexual orientation, gender-based
stereotyping, and subordination. But these are sources that Judge Posner,
like his fellow judges in Hively, chose not to see.”).
222
See Soucek, supra note 81, at 127–28 (arguing that Judge Posner utilizes
his own autobiographical experiences to make conclusion that sexual
orientation and sex are connected instead of utilizing sources that study “the
dynamics of sexual orientation, gender-based stereotyping, and
subordination”). Compare Hively, 853 F.3d at 353 (Posner, J., concurring)
(noting that homosexuality was not a concern of legislatures at time of Title
VII’s enactment and providing anecdotal evidence of his personal
experiences stating that “[h]ad I been asked then whether I had ever met a
male homosexual, I would have answered: probably not; had I been asked
whether I had ever met a lesbian I would have answered ‘only in the pages
of A la recherché du temps perdu’”), with Franklin, supra note 2, at 1379
(noting that Judge Posner did not think sex discrimination should expand to
sexual orientation discrimination and that he did not think that Title VII
creates “a federally protected right for male workers to wear nail polish and
dresses and speak in falsetto and mince about in high heels” (quoting
language from Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058,
1066 (7th Cir. 2003)).
223
See Soucek, supra note 81, at 128 (concluding that all of the judges in
Hively chose not to engage with these types of sources).
224
Goldberg, supra note 37, at 787.
225
See id. (arguing that “there is nothing inherent in harassing acts and
stereotyping statements in general that makes their underlying
discriminatory intent fundamentally easier to unmask than the
discriminatory intent that might underlie other types of adverse treatment.

KRALL: ONE TEXT, ANOTHER RENDERING NOW: IN THE WAKE OF HIVELY V. IVY TECH CMTY. COLL. OF
IND., THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE TO DEFINE SEX DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE VII

72

DEPAUL J. WOMEN, GEN & LAW

[Vol. VII: II

shared a common context on the social meaning of those
statements.226 Therefore, what courts, including the Seventh
Circuit, need to do is start delving into how our nation’s
conceptions on sex and sexual orientation have developed and
changed.227 By engaging in a sociological inquiry, the court can
add substance to sex discrimination that provides an actual
rationale for their decisions as opposed to conclusory statements
that sexual orientation discrimination falls under sex
discrimination.228 Courts, understandably, are wary of engaging in
this sort of inquiry because of charges that the courts are
formulating their social views into legal rules.229 One way to
combat this judicial legitimacy issue is for courts to rely on experts
in the fields of sex, gender, and sexual orientation to provide them
with an updated social context.230 While experts can create more
power imbalances in court due to their high costs, their strategic
use as advocates for viewing sexual orientation discrimination as a
form of sex discrimination can shift courts’ reliance on
Instead, it is agreement (or presumed agreement) on the social meaning of
those acts and statements, when considered through a contextual lens, that
renders the cases easy for courts to decide.”).
226
Id.
227
See Soucek, supra note 81, at 116 (highlighting that the Hively opinions
do not mention any antidiscrimination or gender theorist, legal historian, or
gay rights advocate, which ends up creating an opinion that offers “an
originalism without history, a dynamic interpretation that lacks a limiting
principle, and a textualism largely disengaged from the values Title VII’s
text is best understood to promote”); see also Eskridge, supra note 36, at
1482–83 (positing that judges should recognize that interpretation is
applying meaning to a current context and that, while textual and historical
perspectives are important factors, how the social and legal environment has
changed over time is also a factor).
228
See Soucek, supra note 81, at 128 (determining that advocates need to
highlight gender policing that links sexual orientation discrimination with
sex discrimination); cf. Goldberg, supra note 37, at 740 (proposing that
courts have favored the comparator approach because of judicial legitimacy
issues, and, thus, courts refuse to make sociologically oriented inquires).
229
Goldberg, supra note 37, at 793.
230
See id. at 797 (suggesting that using experts would legitimize court
decisions and help courts themselves update their ability to discern
discrimination).
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comparators to a reliance on social science data.231 In doing so,
experts could periodically update the courts with developments in
social science, but this would no longer be necessary for every
case because courts would rely on the social science data.232
V. CURIOUSER AND CURIOUSER: HIVELY’S IMPACT ON THE
SEXUAL ORIENTATION DEBATE
While Hively represents a shift in the sex discrimination
debate, the conflicting opinions from both the judicial and
executive branch create confusion for employers and employees
about discrimination in the work place and uncertainty for the
courts about how to identify sex discrimination.233 Hively
provided an answer to the issue of sexual orientation
discrimination but did not provide an adequate framework in
which to analyze future cases, creating future difficulty for the
courts in how to apply the holding in other sexual orientation
cases.234 Moreover, sticking to the anti-classification framework
231

See generally id. at 798–800 (conceding some issues with using experts,
but also recognizing potential middle ground where experts are necessary
sporadically in order to update the judiciary on social science
developments).
232
Cf. id. at 800 (explaining how family responsibilities discrimination
(FRD) advocates used experts, popular culture, and social science data to
ease courts into seeing the link between family responsibilities and sex in
order to reach point where link “can be seen easily and without any special
training”).
233
Blair Druhan Bullock, What to Do with the Federal Government's
Internally Inconsistent Interpretations of Title VII, LEXOLOGY (Aug. 17,
2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=db7c183b-0f4b46a7-8455-2abd064c4ed2. See generally White, supra note 82 (illustrating
the EEOC’s struggle with interpretive authority and how the courts and
executive branch enter into interpretive debate).
234
See supra notes 182–221 and accompanying text for discussion of
Hively’s framework and its limitations. Compare Jessica Mason Pieklo,
Roberts Court Kicks the Can on Employment Discrimination Based on
Sexual Orientation, REWIRE (Dec. 12, 2017),
https://rewire.news/article/2017/12/12/roberts-court-kicks-can-employmentdiscrimination-sexual-orientation/ (reporting that Supreme Court declined to
hear case of employment discrimination against lesbian and noting that
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may prevent new potential types of sex discrimination claims from
emerging.235 Thus, courts will continue to use the traditional anticlassification framework that will prevent new understandings of
sex discrimination from taking hold in the legal context.236 In
lower courts are split on sexual orientation discrimination), with Alison
Frankel, How Trump’s DOJ’s About-Face on LGBT Workplace Bias Could
Backfire at SCOTUS, REUTERS (Sept. 11, 2017)
https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-otc-lgbt/how-trump-dojs-about-face-onlgbt-workplace-bias-could-backfire-at-scotus-idUKKCN1BM2DD
(reporting that LBGT group Lambda Legal hopes the Supreme Court will
take up the issue because both the EEOC and Department of Justice enforce
Title VII), Joanna L. Grossman & Anthony Michael Kreis, Unsolicited
Opinion: The Department of Justice Files Brief Urging Court to Block
Rights for LGBT Employees, JUSTIA (Aug. 1, 2017),
https://verdict.justia.com/2017/08/01/unsolicited-opinion-departmentjustice-files-brief-urging-court-block-rights-lgbt-employees (reporting that
Attorney General Sessions filed brief for Zarda arguing against sexual
orientation claims under Title VII), Erin Mulvaney, Government Agencies to
Clash in Upcoming Case on Sexual Orientation, THE NATIONAL LAW
JOURNAL (Sept. 21, 2017),
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202798551263/GovernmentAgencies-To-Clash-In-Upcoming-Case-On-Sexual-Orientation (noting that
2d Circuit will hear from both the EEOC and Department of Justice in
Zarda), Brian Tashman, 6 Questions for Trump’s EEOC Nominees: Will
LGBT, Disability, and Women’s Rights Be Protected?, ACLU (Sept. 18,
2017), https://www.aclu.org/blog/lgbt-rights/6-questions-trumps-eeocnominees-will-lgbt-disability-and-womens-rights-be (recommending that
senators ask nominees about whether sexual orientation discrimination is a
form of sex discrimination).
235
See Goldberg, supra note 37, at 812 (concluding that the comparator
methodology “has foreclosed most discrimination claims and, further,
shrunk the very idea of discrimination, both truncating traditional
discrimination jurisprudence and all but guaranteeing that second-generation
discrimination theories will not translate into law”).
236
See Franklin, supra note 2, at 1315 (arguing that the Supreme Court
adopted the anti-classification concept of sex discrimination which limited
its scope and insulated from courts other employment regulations that
maintained social stratification); cf. Allison E. Maue, 11th Circuit: Sexual
Orientation is Not Actionable Under Title VII, THE NATIONAL LAW REVIEW
(March 30, 2017), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/11th-circuitsexual-orientation-discrimination-not-actionable-under-title-vii (reporting
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turn, discriminated individuals, under non-traditional types of sex
discrimination, will have a low probability of success in court and
the very meaning of sex discrimination will remain narrow and
static.237
Regardless, with some courts protecting against sexual
orientation discrimination, some states enacting their own sexual
orientation discrimination laws, and the potential for the Supreme
Court to weigh in on the issue, employers should start
implementing employment practices that advocate against sexual
orientation discrimination.238 Various commentators suggest that
employers should be proactive and adopt a “common
denominator” approach, where employers provide all employees
the same protections with specific policies addressing how
employees should report discrimination and harassment.239
Moreover, employees who wish to bring a valid sexual orientation
that the 11th Circuit in Evans v. Ga. Regional Hospital held that sexual
orientation is not actionable under Title VII because of binding precedent).
237
Goldberg, supra note 37, at 734.
238
See Druhan Bullock, supra note 233 (noting the different positions from
the EEOC, DOJ, and courts while also highlighting that at least 20 states
currently prohibit sexual orientation discrimination through state statutes).
239
See Allison Waterfield, Gender Transitioning in the Workplace:
Employer Obligations and Best Practices, BLOOMBERG BNA L. & EMP.
BLOG (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.bna.com/gender-transitioningworkplace-b73014472559/ (recommending that employers give gender
transitioning policies full weight as opposed to suggestions, respect privacy
and confidentiality, work with employees on transition plans, create
adequate recordkeeping documents, and designate someone as point of
contact); see also Allison L. Goico & Hayley Geiler, Supreme Court Leaves
The Issue of Sexual Orientation Discrimination Unresolved, THE NATIONAL
LAW REVIEW (Dec. 12, 2017),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/supreme-court-leaves-issue-sexualorientation-discrimination-unresolved (advising employers to stay up-todate on applicable laws and to maintain policies that prohibit sexual
orientation discrimination including mechanisms for reporting and
investigation); cf. EEOC, What You Should Know About EEOC and the
Enforcement Protections or LGBT Workers, EEOC NEWSROOM,
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/wysk/enforcement_protections_lgbt_
workers.cfm#training (last visited April 7, 2018) (providing information on
the relevant law as well as training, outreach, and resources for employers).
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discrimination case should first look to see if their state has a
separate statute covering sexual orientation discrimination.240 If
not, they should consider filing with the EEOC who will
investigate the case and determine if there is cause to file the
lawsuit.241 However, the EEOC’s position, while influential, is not
entitled to deference in the federal courts.242 As such, whether an
employee is able to sustain a valid sex discrimination claim is
dependent upon the circuit in which the complaint is filed.243
Using Hively as momentum, individuals are trying to
overturn precedent in other circuits and are attempting to have the
Supreme Court weigh in on the issue.244 Notably, the Second
Circuit in Zarda v. Altitude Express, where a skydiving instructor
brought a Title VII claim against his employer alleging that he was
fired because he was gay, recently became the second circuit court
to determine that sexual orientation discrimination is a subset of
sex discrimination.245 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has
ultimately refused to hear arguments on the matter.246 However, if
240

See EEOC, supra note 239 (explaining the process for protecting against
sexual orientation discrimination including applicable laws and how the
EEOC enforces Title VII).
241
Id.
242
See Druhan Bullock, supra note 233 (explaining that federal courts are
not required to follow EEOC’s opinion and that federal courts are bound by
their respective precedent).
243
Id.
244
See generally Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 855 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2017)
(deciding that sexual orientation discrimination is not a form of sex
discrimination because of precedent), vacat’d & remanded, 2018 WL
1040820 (2d Cir. Feb. 26, 2018).
245
Zarda, 2018 WL 1040820, at *20 (2d Cir. Feb. 26, 2018); see also Laura
Lawless Robertson, Title VII Bars Sexual Orientation Discrimination, Says
US Second Circuit Court of Appeals, THE NATIONAL LAW REVIEW (Feb. 26,
2018), https://www.employmentlawworldview.com/title-vii-bars-sexualorientation-discrimination-says-second-circuit-court-of-appeals-us/
(reporting on the 2nd Circuit’s decision and explaining the court’s three
reasonings: (1) sex is necessarily factor of sexual orientation, (2) sexual
orientation discrimination is based on gendered assumptions, and (3) sexual
orientation discrimination is a form of associational discrimination).
246
See Chris Johnson, Supreme Court won’t hear case seeking Title VII
protection for gays, WASH. BLADE (Dec. 11, 2017),
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other circuits continue to follow in the Seventh Circuit’s footsteps,
there will be an increasing need for the Supreme Court to step
in.247 Otherwise, employers will remain unsure of how to
adequately comply with Title VII, especially for employers that
operate within multiple jurisdictions.248 With employers and
employees unsure about the validity of their claims, courts and the
EEOC will probable experience increased litigation.249
VI. WHERE ARE WE NOW: STEPS TOWARDS UNDERSTANDING
SEX DISCRIMINATION
Sex discrimination started off as a forum in which to
debate concepts of sex, gender, and stereotypes, but the Supreme
Court quickly cut off that debate, opting for a clear-cut “objective”
approach, effectively silencing any development in what sex
discrimination covered.250 Regardless, the Supreme Court slowly
added additional types of claims to sex discrimination.251 In
adding gender non-conformity as a potential avenue for sex
discrimination, the Court opened the door to sexual orientation
http://www.washingtonblade.com/2017/12/11/supreme-court-wont-hearcase-seeking-title-vii-protection-for-gays/ (explaining that the Supreme
Court denied writ of certiorari after the 11th Circuit held that sexual
orientation did not fall under Title VII).
247
See Robertson, supra note 245 (positing that the Supreme Court may be
more open to hearing the issue now that three circuits have weighed in on
the matter); see also Louis L. Chodoff et al., The Split Deepens: 2nd Circuit
Holds that Title VII Bans Sexual Orientation Discrimination, THE
NATIONAL LAW REVIEW (Feb. 28, 2018),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/split-deepens-2nd-circuit-holds-titlevii-bans-sexual-orientation-discrimination (arguing that the Supreme Court
has more incentive to weigh in on the issue).
248
See Robertson, supra note 245 (highlighting that employers need to
review local laws to ensure their policies comport with them); see also
supra note 239 (providing advice on what employers should do).
249
See supra note 241 and accompanying text for discussion of what
employees should do.
250
See supra notes 44–56 and accompanying text for discussion of Title
VII’s historical debate on sex discrimination.
251
See supra notes 57–62 and accompanying text for discussion of Supreme
Court decisions on sex discrimination.
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discrimination claims.252 However, courts were quick to shut that
door because these claims were in contention with how courts
have traditionally approached sex discrimination.253 The Seventh
Circuit was the first circuit court to decide that sexual orientation
discrimination was a form of sex discrimination, but the court still
held onto the formalist approach that prevented developments in
courts’ understanding of what sex discrimination means.254
Rather, the court should have relied on the gender non-conformity
method and coupled it with developments in social science and in
our nation’s understanding of how sex and sexual orientation are
connected.255 In doing so, the court would have been able to
provide a much more persuasive reasoning for their decision.256 A
reasoning that would supply other courts, including the Supreme
Court, with the necessary arguments to hold that sexual orientation
discrimination is, in fact, a form of sex discrimination.257

252

See supra notes 68–77 and accompanying text for discussion of how
lower courts struggled with separating gender nonconformity and sexual
orientation discrimination.
253
See supra note 75 and accompanying text for discussion of courts
refusing to listen to gender non-conformity cases if they involved a sexual
orientation component.
254
See supra notes 90–181 and accompanying text for discussion of Hively
decision; see also supra notes 182–206 and accompanying text for
discussion of how majority held onto the formalist approach.
255
See supra notes 207–232 and accompanying text for argument that social
science and the gender non-conformity method create a method that aligns
with sexual orientation discrimination as a form of sex discrimination.
256
See supra notes 222–232 and accompanying text for argument that
court’s analysis would have been more persuasive if it utilized different
framework.
257
See supra notes 233–249 and accompanying text for discussion of
Hively’s impact on future cases.

